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UNRAVELING THE CHICAGO/HARV ARD ANTITRUST 
DOUBLE HELIX: 
APPLYING EVOLUTIONARY THEORY TO GUARD 
COMPETITORS 
AND REVIVE ANTITRUST JURY TRIALS 
Thomas J. Hortont 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most striking and shocking antitrust paradigms in the 
United States today is an extreme judicial tolerance of monopolies 
and predatory conduct.! Turning Section 2 of the Sherman Ace on its 
t Associate Professor of Law and Johnson, Heidepriem & Abdallah Trial Advocacy 
Fellow, The University of South Dakota School of Law. The author wishes to thank 
Tom Geu, Maurice Stucke, Spencer Weber Waller, Dr. Richard Rosse, Dr. Mariano 
Garcia-Blanco, Robert Lande, Robert Draba, Hays Gorey, Debra Roy, Ken Davidson, 
and James Brock for their helpful comments and inspiration; and Stephannie 
Bonaiuto, Teresa Carlisle, and Emily BIas for their able and assiduous efforts. 
1. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004) (defending monopoly pricing as "an important element of the free-market 
system"); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED: How MILTON FRIEDMAN AND 
CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, at xviii (2011) ("[Arguing that,] [olver time,. . the concern with 
undue business power as a threat to freedom [has] shifted to a concern with undue 
government regulation of business as a threat to individual political freedoms."); 
Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 497, 498 (2009) ("The Court's view on monopolies has become forgiving."); 
Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 12 (2009) ("[M]onopolization cases and abuse of dominance 
cases (particularly successful ones) are relatively rare birds."); Spencer Weber Waller, 
The Role of Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Competition Law, 20 loY. 
CONSUMER L. REv. 123, 124 (2008) ("In the United States, at least, it seems the 
balance has tipped solidly in favor of viewing monopolies as less problematic than 
cartels and similar anti competitive agreements. "). 
2. 15 U.S.c. § 2 (2006). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id 
Possessing monopoly power by itself does not violate Section 2; a plaintiff must also 
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head,3 a majority oftoday's Supreme Court views monopolies as "an 
important element of the free market system" and believes that 
monopoly pricing allows dominant firms to engage in "risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth.,,4 Furthermore, this 
belief is coupled with a strong antipathy toward antitrust jury trials 
and an eager willingness to keep monopolization cases away from 
juries. 5 Consequently, for the increasingly rare plaintiffs jury verdict 
that may sneak through the expanding arsenal of judicial blockades, 
such as dismissal and summary judgment, outright reversal likely 
awaits. 6 
How did we get to such a point? In his groundbreaking 2007 
article, The Intellectual DNA of Modem Us. Competition Law for 
show "the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
(1966). For an excellent overview of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and relevant 
cases, see AM. BAR. AsS'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 1 ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS 225-323 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS ]. 
3. See RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, 
LAW 239 (1996) ("[Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner's view that] "whenever 
monopoly would increase efficiency it should be tolerated, indeed encouraged' .. 
turns on its head the traditional view that competition is important both in and of 
itself, as a fair, meritocratic process, and in light of a whole ensemble of expected 
benefits including not only efficiency but also low prices to consumers, product 
innovation, and a preference for independent entrepreneurs.") (quoting RiCHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 28 (2d ed. 2001). 
4. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407; see also, Stucke, supra note 1, at 498 ("[In Trinka, the Court] 
surmised for the first time that charging monopoly prices is "an important element of 
the free-market system,' and that monopoly pricing serves as an inducement to 'attract 
[] "business acumen" in the first place' and engage in "risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth. "') (alteration in original) (quoting Trinka, 540 U.S. 
at 407). 
5. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 85 (arguing that the Supreme Court has relied on 
the alleged risks of "chilling effects," "false positives," and "wrong factual 
conclusions" in antitrust cases to conclude that juries should be stripped of their 
traditional fact finding functions). 
6. See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 
(2007) (reversing jury verdict for sawmill operator against Weyerhauser for 
monopolizing Pacific Northwest input market for alder sawlogs); Brooke Group, Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (reversing plaintiff 
cigarette manufacturer's jury verdict against competitor under the Robinson-Patman 
Act). The government also has shown a great reluctance to file suits under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act during the last ten years. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of 
Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 1375, 1453-54 (2009). 
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Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix,7 then 
Federal Trade Commissioner, William E. Kovacic, traced the genesis 
and development of America's current judicial tolerance for 
monopolies and intolerance for antitrust jury trials. 8 Applying the 
creative metaphor of a genetic double helix, 9 Commissioner Kovacic 
argued that ''the intellectual DNA of U.S. antitrust doctrine governing 
single-ftrm conduct today ... is chiefly a double helix that consists of 
two intertwined chains of ideas, one drawn from the Chicago School 
of Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook, and the 
other drawn from the Harvard School (HS) of Phillip Areeda, Donald 
Turner, and Stephen Breyer."IO 
7. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. 
REv. I (2007). 
8. !d. at 2-16. 
9. Commissioner Kovacic credited "Francis Crick's and James Watson's discovery of 
the structure of DNA" for the "double helix imagery" used in his paper. Id at 14 
n.35. See generally JAMES D. WATSON, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE (2003). "Genes 
are sequences of DNA letters that when activated by the cell make a particular 
protein." Matt Ridley, Modern Darwins, in THE BEST AMEruCAN SCIENCE AND 
NATURE WruTING liS (Freeman Dysan ed., 2010). For easy-to-follow discussions of 
DNA base pairs, see FRANCIS CruCK, LIFE ITSELF: ITS OruGIN AND NATURE (1981), 
reprinted in THE OXFORD BOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE WRITING, 30, 31-33 (Richard 
Dawkins ed., 2008) and CHARLES SEIFE, DECODING THE UNIVERSE: How THE SCIENCE 
OF INFORMATION Is EXPLAINING EVERYTHING IN THE COSMOS, FROM OUR BRAINS TO 
BLACK HOLES, 91-92 (2006). For an excellent analysis of how DNA works, see 
Francis 1. Ayala, Molecular Evolution, in EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR BILLION 
YEARS 132, 150 (Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis eds., 2009). Ayala explains: 
Id. 
In all organisms, from bacteria to humans, the instructions that 
guide the development and functioning of organisms are encased 
in the same hereditary material, DNA, which provides the 
instructions for the synthesis of proteins. The thousands of 
diverse proteins that exist in organisms consist of the same 20 
amino acids in all organisms, from bacteria to plants and to 
animals. The genetic code, by which the information contained in 
the DNA of the cell nucleus is passed on to proteins, is shared by 
all sorts of organisms. All organisms use similar metabolic 
pathways-sequences of biochemical reactions-to produce 
energy and to make up the cell components. 
10. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 13-14 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, when the two 
schools have clashed, the Supreme Court generally has followed the Harvard, rather 
than the Chicago School, approach. Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and 
Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1911, 1918-20 (2009) (reviewing How THE 
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008)). See generally 8 PHILLIP E. 
618 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
The fIrst ChicagolHarvard philosophical antitrust chain is built 
around the idea that monopolies are generally efficient and 
procompetitive. II This chain was constructed methodically by 
employing Darwinian "survival of the fittest" metaphorsl2 essentially 
to argue that in a laissez-faire economic world, "there is struggle and 
competition, and the weakest go to the walL,,13 As stated by Judge 
Frank Easterbrook, "it is through the process of weeding out the 
weakest firms that the economy as a whole receives the greatest 
boost.,,14 The ultimate contention of this philosophical chain is that 
we should be cautious about trying to apply the antitrust laws to 
regulate a monopoly fIrm's size, structure, or conduct because "[t]he 
cost of false positives counsels against undue expansion of § 2 
liability.,,15 
The second intertwined Chicago/Harvard philosophical antitrust 
chain involves "cautions about the administrability of legal rules and 
the capacity of the institutions entrusted with implementing 
them .... "16 Under this chain, a "prominent focal point for criticism 
by Areeda and Turner was the availability of jury trials in private 
antitrust cases.,,17 Indeed, "[t]he inadequacies of juries constituted a 
recurring justification for the restrictions that Areeda and Turner 
wished to impose on the prosecution of Section Two theories of 
liability.,,18 Professor Turner even "recommended that jury trials for 
private cases be eliminated.,,19 He worried that antitrust issues 
required "an analysis of economic and business factors beyond the 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATIONS ~ 1604 (3d ed. 2010). 
11. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 14-15. Commissioner Kovacic views this helix as 
"Chicago's main contribution to the double helix." Id. at 14. 
12. See Thomas 1. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse 
of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and 
Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.1. 469, 479 (2011); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REv. 645,683 (1985). 
13. Michael Ruse, The History of Evolutionary Thought, in EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR 
BILLION YEARS 1, 29 (Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis eds., 2009). 
14. Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for 
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345, 346 (2003). 
IS. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 
(2004). Professor Herbert Hovenkamp brilliantly has characterized such purported 
concerns as "[t]he fake problem of false positives in competitor lawsuits." Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1,33 (1989). 
16. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 14. Commissioner Kovacic considers this to be "Harvard's 
main contribution to the double helix." Id. 
17. Jd. at 53. 
18. Jd. 
19. Id. at 54. 
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competence of most jurors,,,20 and that the use of intent standards 
created "a high likelihood that jury decisions [would] be influenced 
by emotional and other irrational factors. ,,21 
It is time to unravel and replace the Chicago/Harvard antitrust 
double helix. Building upon the evolutionary analyses in previous 
papers,22 this article recommends a new philosophical antitrust double 
helix that will generate increased enforcement of and compliance 
with the language and spirit of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and 
Section 7 of the Clayton ACt.23 Following Commissioner Kovacic's 
metaphor, a new evolutionary antitrust double helix should be built 
around the genetic base pairs G-C and A_T.24 In the recommended 
new evolutionary antitrust double helix, G-C bases will "guard 
competitors, ,,25 and A -T bases will revive "antitrust [jury] trials. ,,26 
First addressing the proposed guarding competitors ("G-C") base 
pairs, the author discusses in Part II how the oft-used normative 
cliche that "antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors,,27 has 
20. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust 
Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 797,813 (1987). 
21. Id. 
22. See Thomas 1. Horton, Competition or Monopoly? The Implications of Complexity 
Science, Chaos Theory, and Evolutionary Biology for Antitrust and Competition 
Policy, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 195 (2006); Horton, supra note 12. 
23. A DNA double helix carries information that can be translated by RNA in a 
transcription process to make the complex proteins of life. See Ridley, supra note 9, 
at 115. Similarly, our antitrust laws are transcribed and interpreted by our antitrust 
enforcers and courts to set the rules of economic competition. While recognizing that 
"there is a general skeptical attitude of a large sector of the legal scholarship towards 
the evolutionary approach," Mauro Zamboni, Making Evolutionary Theory Useful for 
Legal Actors, in LAW, ECONOMICS, AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 270 (Peer 
Zumbanson & Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2011), the author believes that it is time for 
the antitrust enforcers and courts to begin transcribing and interpreting our antitrust 
laws from a new philosophical and information template. 
24. In DNA, the double helices are held together by hydrogen bonds between guanine 
(G), which always pairs with cytosine (C); and adenine (A), which always pairs with 
thymine (T). See CRICK, supra note 9, at 31-32. Thus, the alternating individual base 
pairs, which collectively encode genes, are denoted as G-C or A-T. 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See, e.g., ZF Meritor L.L.c. v. Eaton Corp., 769 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. Del. 2011). 
In a famous passage in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Chief 
Justice Warren observed that "[t]aken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates 
congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors .... " Id at 
320. For a discussion of how Harvard's Phillip Areeda selectively used the above 
language to ultimately "recast the philosophy of Brown Shoe from what previously 
had been seen to be a position of acute concern for the well-being of individual firms 
to a position of indifference to their fate," see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 58. 
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been twisted and distorted from its original benign legal use into a 
dangerous indifference to the welfare of competitors and a strong bias 
in favor of dominant fIrms and predatory conduct. Applying an 
evolutionary analysis, this article contends that a diversity and variety 
of economic competitors at all levels is crucial to a healthy economic 
system. 28 Therefore, we should reform the misappropriated and 
misapplied "protect competition, not competitors" cliche, and return 
to protecting competition by guarding competitors against unfair and 
malicious predatory conduct. 29 
Turning to the proposed antitrust jury trials ("A-T") base pairs in 
Part III, this article addresses how the Chicago/Harvard antitrust 
double helix has been successfully employed to neutralize and negate 
the issue of intent in Section 2 cases,30 and how the right to and 
importance of jury trials has been overridden by anti-democratic 
judicial overreaching.3l Following evolutionary theory, this article 
asserts that a jury is well-equipped to determine issues of fairness and 
predatory intent in a monopolization case, and to reach a meaningful 
conclusion.32 We should therefore begin returning monopolization 
cases to juries and allow jurors to fully consider evidence of intent, 
purposefulness, and fairness. 
II. UNRAVELING THE CHICAGOIHARV ARD APPROACH TO 
DOMINANT FIRMS 
The fIrst ChicagolHarvard antitrust helix boldly accepts, and even 
lionizes, dominant fIrms and monopolies. 33 As explained by FTC 
Commissioner Kovacic, Justices Scalia and Breyer joined forces in 
the Supreme Court's 2004 Trinka decision, which includes "cautions 
about the costs of wrongly condemning benign or pro competitive 
conduct, warnings about the dangers of rules that would mandate 
cooperation between competitors, and reminders of the institutional 
limitations of antitrust tribunals. ,,34 
28. See infra Part II.B. 
29. As explained by Commissioner Kovacic, prior to the evolution of the 
Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix, American antitrust doctrine was much less 
forgiving of dominant finn predatory conduct across a wide breadth of behaviors, 
including predatory pricing and denying access to essential facilities. See Kovacic, 
supra note 7, at 42-45. 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. See infra Part III. 
32. See infra Part IIl.A-C. 
33. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 35. 
34. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 67 (footnotes omitted) (citing Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 392, 407-15 (2004)). Commissioner 
Kovacic observes that the "majority opinion bears the name of Justice Scalia, but the 
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The first strand of the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix 
presumes: 
[t]hat overinclusive applications of antitrust law to control 
dominant firm conduct pose greater hazards to economic 
performance than underinclusive applications. This 
presumption assumes that the likelihood that entry and 
adaptability by competitors, customers, and suppliers more 
often than not will blunt dominant firm efforts to exerCIse 
market power.35 
This helix therefore "discourage[ s] consideration of [supposed] 
non-efficiency objectives such as... the preservation of 
opportunities for smaller enterprises to compete. ,,36 
Fairness also is anathema under this helix. Indeed, in one passage 
of their famous joint antitrust textbook, Professors Areeda and Turner 
argued that "[a]s a goal of antitrust policy, 'fairness' is a vagrant 
claim applied to any value that one happens to favor.,,37 
It is time to reassess the philosophical presumptions of the first 
ChicagolHarvard antitrust helix, which lionizes dominant firms and 
monopolies and tacitly lauds and encourages predatory conduct. 38 As 
stated in the Introduction, a new evolutionary antitrust model built 
around the G-C base pairs should replace the outmoded and 
discredited theoretical ChicagolHarvard bases. 39 The new G-C base 
text unmistakably is the product of a Scalia-Breyer (Chicago/Harvard) 
collaboration. . .. To study the Trinka majority opinion is to see that Justice Scalia 
relied heavily on Justice Breyer's ideas to state the decision's rationale." ld at 68. 
35. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 72. To satisfy the exclusionary conduct element of Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must establish the element of "anticompetitive 
conduct." Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407. The courts have long wrestled WIth the issue of 
what acts constitute anticompetitive conduct, and a full discussion is beyond the scope 
of this article. However, exclusionary conduct can include "vertical restrictions 
limiting competitor access to customers or suppliers, denials of rivals' requests for 
access, product design and new product introduction, predatory pricing, misuses of 
government and standard-setting processes, and tortious conduct." ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 245; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting 
Antitrust, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL POLICY 211,228-29 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991) (listing 
thirteen "[ s ]pecific examples of strategic behavior that is problematic"). 
36. ld at 35. 
37. 4 PHILLIP AREEDA& DONALDF. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 21 (1980). 
38. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 6-7 (describing the philosophical roots that spurred 
insulation of and permissiveness regarding dominant firm conduct). 
39. As noted by Kenneth M. Davidson, the Chicago/Harvard double helix's "unrealistic 
and narrow view of human nature . has led to the formulation of bad antitrust law 
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pairs recommend that the best way to protect competition is to guard 
competitors against unfair and predatory dominant fIrm conduct. 40 
Section II.A addresses the misunderstood origins of the Supreme 
Court's normative "protecting competition, not competitors" 
language in Brown Shoe,4! which has been zealously invoked by the 
ChicagolHarvard theoreticians to block the proper translation of our 
antitrust laws. 42 The author concludes that the phrase, as currently 
applied, lacks meaningful historical or statutory support.43 Applying 
an evolutionary analysis, Section II.B then discusses how diversity 
and variation are natural states that allow evolution in a healthy 
biological ecosystem or, by analogy, in a competitive economic 
system.44 Giantism is not natural, and monopolies are not favored in 
nature.45 We should not, therefore, favor or rationalize them 
economically. Section II.C then explains how a lack of diversity in a 
complex system generally results only from outside constraints, 
which can include death and extinction from predation. 46 Based on 
these discussions, Section II concludes that it makes evolutionary and 
competitive sense to protect and promote economic diversity and 
variation by guarding competitors against unfair, predatory conduct 
by dominant fIrms or monopolies. 47 
and bad public policy." DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at xiii; see also John B. Kirkwood & 
Robert E. Lande, The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects 
Consumers, Not Efficiency, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 89, 
90 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) ("[T]he Chicago School is wrong, as to both 
congressional intent and to recent case law."); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF 
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at xiv (2009) 
(asserting that ideology driven by self-interested decisions from the business 
community can distort economic policy and give rise to depression); YVES SMITH, 
ECONNED: How ENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY AND 
CORRUPTED CAPITALISM 93 (2010) (condemning market assumptions of neoclassical 
economics); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA. FREE MARKETS, AND THE 
SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 260 (2010) (attacking Chicago School economics). 
40. See infra notes 177-178 and accompanying text. 
41. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
42. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56-59 (discussing how Harvard's Phillip Areeda recast 
the antitrust-policy language of Brown Shoe from that of strong protectionism to 
relative indifference). 
43. See generally id. 
44. See infra notes 112-121 and accompanying text. 
45. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text. 
46. See Horton, supra note 12, at 488. 
47. See id. at 521. 
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A. Are the Antitrust Laws Really Indifferent to Competitors? 
The simple normative mantra supporting the fIrst strand of the 
Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix is that the antitrust laws 
protect "competition, not competitors. ,,48 As Commissioner Kovacic 
aptly notes: 
The [Brunswick] decision's admonition that antitrust 
protects "competition, not competitors" has become one of 
the most heavily quoted aphorisms in the fIeld of 
competition law. Incessant, often mechanical repetition by 
commentators, corporate defendants, and public offIcials has 
made it an antitrust cliche. . .. Whether one enjoys or 
detests the "competition, not competitors" phrase, the 
magnitude of the antitrust injury doctrine it heralded is 
indisputable. 49 
One need not look far to see verbatim citation after citation of this 
mantra50 to support the Chicago/Harvard agenda of blessing dominant 
48. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56-58. 
49. Id. at 60-61 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 
488 (1977); see also Harry S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces 
Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 J. CORP. L. 1, 34 (1986) ("[T]he saying 'the 
antitrust laws protect competitors, not competition' is the leading aphorism of modern 
antitrust law."); Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and its "Rule 
of Reason ": The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section I of the 
Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L. REv. 129, 184 n.252 (1989) (quoting the relevant 
"competition, not competitors" language and arguing that "[t]his unfortunate 
statement has acquired a life of its own, often used to support broad statements that 
the fate of individual competitors, such as small dealers or discount stores, is of no 
concern to antitrust law"); Transcript, The Antitrust Marathon: A Roundtable 
Discussion, Part IV: Remedies-How Far and How Much?, 20 Loy. CONSUMER. L. 
REv. 197,200 (2008) (Statement of Christopher Leslie) ("Unfortunately, in the United 
States, it seems to me that standing doctrine is being constrained in a way that's 
reducing the viability of private enforcement. .. With competitors, you've got this 
mantra of antitrust protects competition, not competitors. And some courts are 
misinterpreting that to suggest antitrust doesn't protect competitors at all. There is 
sometimes a lack of understanding regarding the relationship between the existence of 
competitors and the process of competition."). 
50. Recently, in a court filing in an antitrust case, the United States blithely stated that 
"[t]he antitrust laws are concerned with the protection of competition, not individual 
competitors." Supplemental Statement of the United States in Support of Entry of 
Final Judgment at 7, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. ll-106-RJL (D.D.C. Aug. 
5,2011), ECF No. 26. 
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fIrms and predatory conduct. sl For example, in 2001, then Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust Charles James stated simply without 
citation or support: " ... no principle is more central to U.S. law than 
that antitrust protects competition, not competitors. ,,52 One would 
suspect that such a compelling and seemingly fact-based mantra 
would have extensive historical foundations. Indeed, the mantra 
generally appears as a clear statement of fact unequivocally 
supported by the legislative history of the antitrust laws. 53 Yet 
citations to precise portions 0 f the antitrust laws' legislative histories 
supporting the statement never seem to appear. Perhaps the simple 
reason for this is that the emperor has no clothes. 
The actual origins of the phrase can be seen in a pro-big business 
1952 Fortune Magazine editorial titled, The New Competition and 
Antitrust Policy. 54 The Fortune editorial began by lauding big 
business and argued that under an economics-based antitrust policy, 
"rivalry of a few large sellers [does not] necessarily mean[] economic 
injustice.,,55 The editorial then turned to the Clayton Act,56 which had 
51. For example, in a January 31, 2003, note submitted by the United States ''under 
Session I (Part n of the Global Forum on Competition" held February 10-11, 2003, 
the United States stated without citation: 
Market competition enhances consumer welfare and promotes 
an efficient allocation of society's resources because those firms 
that best meet the needs of consumers with the lowest prices or 
best service will prosper. It is therefore a basic principle of U.S. 
antitrust law that antitrust laws should protect competition, not 
competitors. The mere fact that a particular competitor is injured 
by a practice does not mean that the practice is or should be 
prohibited. In fact, it is inherent in the process of competition and 
some firms prosper and others do not. It is the process of 
competition that U.S. law protects. 
OECD, THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AND THE OPTIMAL DESIGN 
OF A COMPETITION AGENCY 3 (2003); see also Thomas O. Barnett, Section 2 
Remedies: What to Do After Catching the Tiger by the Tail, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 31, 35 
(2009) ("[C]ompetitor well-being, in itself, is not the purpose of our antitrust laws."). 
52. Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't. of Justice Antitrust Div., 
International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence (Oct. 17, 
2001). 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 70-78. 
54. The New Competition and Antitrust Policy, FORTUNE, June 1952, reprinted in 
MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION 164, 164 (Edwin Mansfield ed., 1968). 
55 Id. 
56. 15 U.S.c. § 18 (2006). Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions 
"where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section 
of the country, the effect of such acquisition .. may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id. For a solid overview of section 7 
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been amended two years earlier based on "a fear of what was 
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration. ,,57 The 
editorial argued: 
A good case can be made for tightening up some parts of 
antitrust law and enforcing it more vigorously. But an even 
better case can be made for the proposition that the law 
applies the classic model too literally. In general, it lacks an 
economic approach to what are essentially economic 
problems. In its preoccupation with "maintaining" 
competition, as ordained in the various amendments to the 
Clayton Act, it has tended to produce an opposite result, i.e., 
to protect competitors from the effects of competition.58 
Despite its strong tone, the editorial did not go so far as to assert 
that the purpose of the antitrust laws is "to protect competition, not 
competitors. ,,59 
Over the next several years, several other Fortune editorials 
criticizing aggressive antitrust enforcement included variations of the 
phrase. 60 For example, in a June 1957 Fortune essay, Charles E. 
of the Clayton Act and relevant cases, see ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra 
note 2, at 325--431. 
57. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962) ("The dominant theme 
pervading congressional consideration of the [Clayton Act's] 1950 amendments was a 
fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the 
American economy."). See generally, e.g., 95 CONGo REc. 11500-07 (1949). For a 
more extensive discussion of the legislative history of the 1950 amendments, see 
Thomas 1. Horton, Fixing Merger Litigation 'Fixes ': Reforming the Litigation of 
Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S.D. L. REv. 165, 
191-94 (2010). 
58. The New Competition and Antitrust Policy, supra note 54, at 167 (emphasis added). 
59. Further presaging the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix, the 1952 Fortune 
editorial concluded: 
[Economic] tests place a heavy responsibility on the discretionary 
powers of the authorities, and may assume more intelligence and 
all-around judgment than the authorities possess. But the tests are 
apt and carefully thought out, and should not be overlooked. 
They or similar economic tests will have to be applied if antitrust 
law is to shape competition to benefit the people whom the 
creators of the classic model themselves intended it to benefit: the 
consumers. 
ld. at 168. 
60. See Creeping Cartelism, u.s. Model, FORTUNE, June 1954, at 99 ("[H]ow far can the 
U.S. go in protecting competitors from the effects of competition without doing away 
with the competition itself?"); Does "Small Business" Get a Fair Shake?, FORTUNE, 
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Silberman stated: "A fundamental paradox of American antitrust 
policy ... is whether to protect competitors or competition.,,61 Mr. 
Silberman did not go so far as to suggest that the legislative history of 
the antitrust laws supported protecting only "competition, not 
competitors." Indeed, recognizing "clear statements" to the contrary, 
he stated that "some lawyers and judges question whether any law's 
legislative history is relevant to its interpretation.,,62 
In 1958, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Victor Hansen 
picked up the phrase, but used it to support an aggressive application 
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.63 After breaking up a deal that 
would have given Lever Bros. Co. 21% of the detergent market, Mr. 
Hansen explained that the United States was rejecting Lever's 
argument that it needed the detergent brand All to better compete 
against Proctor & Gamble, another industry leader. 64 Mr. Hansen 
stated: "We aim to protect competition, not the competitor; to support 
the process, no matter who gets hurt or who benefits.,,65 
A subsequent legal adoption of the phrase appeared in a 1960 FTC 
decision fmding the acquisition of Rawlings Manufacturing 
Company by A. G. Spalding & Brothers, Inc. to have violated 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.66 In a decision overturning the Hearing 
Oct. 1953, at 163, 164 ("Most of the rules of the game between businesses of different 
sizes are covered by anti-monopoly laws, and other laws, such as Fair Trade and the 
Robinson-Patman Act, protecting small business from rigorous competition."). 
61. Charles E. Silberman, The Coming Assault on Bigness, FORTUNE, June 1957, at 142-
43. 
62. Id. at 178. For an excellent overview of FORTUNE'S critiques of antitrust enforcement 
in the 1950s and 1960s, see Tony A. Freyer, What Was Warren Court Antitrust?, 2009 
SUP. CT. REv. 347, 349-59 (2010) (characterizing FORTUNE's "antitrust dialogue" 
during the 1950s and 1960s as "dynamic"). 
63. See Op-Ed, Confusion in Trustbusting, TIME, July 21, 1958, at 74. At the time of 
Assistant Attorney General Hansen's statement, several court opinions supporting 
aggressive antitrust enforcement included iterations of the phrase. For example, in 
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957), the Supreme Court expressly stated 
that Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act was "designed to protect competitors in 
individual transactions." Id at 431; see also William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, 
Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743 (3d Cir. 1945) ("We do not believe it our function to enter into 
the strife of the competitive markets to protect the unfortunate. . .. But, plaintiff does 
have the right to have its business protected if there is a concert of action directed at 
plaintiff, which results in its removal from competition."); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & 
Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941) ("The Commission, provided 
there is a specific and substantial public interest, can protect competitors against such 
methods or consumers against such acts or practices."). 
64. Confusion in Trustbusting, supra note 63. 
65. Id 
66. In re A. G. Spalding & Bros., No. 6478, 1960 FTC LEXIS 219, at *88-89 (Mar. 30, 
1960). 
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Examiner's dismissal of the FTC's complaint, the Commission 
addressed the Hearing Examiner's "plac[ing] considerable emphasis 
on the fact that neither of the officials of Wilson and MacGregor [two 
competitors] who had testified was questioned as to whether his 
company had been adversely affected by the acquisition.,,67 Finding 
that to be "an unsound basis for his conclusion," the Commission 
simply stated without any legal citation or support, "The statute [Sec. 
7 of the Clayton Act] refers to lessening of competition and not to 
injury to competitors. Moreover, it requires only that there be a 
reasonable probability that the acquisition have the proscribed effect 
on competition. ,,68 Again, the phrase was used to support an 
aggressive application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 69 
As often happens in the evolution of the law, however, 
unsupported language appearing in one judicial context is cited as 
legal precedent in a much different context.70 The Commission's 
seemingly benign phrase was thus utilized by the Brown Shoe 
Company in its appeal to the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States.71 In their June 4, 1960, Brief in Opposition to Motion 
to Affirm, Brown Shoe's lawyers cited the Commission's language in 
a footnote to support their argument that: 
67. ld. at *87-89. 
68. ld. at *88. The Commission added: 
ld. 
Even if there had been testimony that Wilson and MacGregor had 
not been adversely affected, it would not alter the significant fact 
that competition which formerly existed among various 
manufacturers in the sale of higher priced gloves and mitts to 
Spalding has been virtually eliminated by the merger. 
69. A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 625 (3d Cir. 1962). In upholding the 
Commission's decision, the Third Circuit never even mentioned the relevant 
language. Instead, the Third Circuit emphasized that Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
"was contrived as a preventive measure to eliminate the proscribed activities before 
they became operative." Id. 
70. Mauro Zamboni has noted how legal scholars: 
can actually directly influence the choice of patterns of future 
development of the law. . For example, law professors, by 
claiming the existence of a certain legal principle of efficiency 
inside tort law as an established 'fact,' can actually force future 
generations of law-makers and law-applying actors to introduce 
this principle, even if the original claim was false. 
Zamboni, supra note 23, at 278; see also Horton, supra note 57, at 171-73 (discussing 
how unsupported language allowing courts to accept unilaterally proposed fixes in 
merger litigation evolved and took "on a prolific [organic] life"). 
71. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
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The district court directed its attention to possible effects on 
certain manufacturers and retailers. However, even if the 
merger would harm a particular competitor, it does not 
follow automatically that "competition" will thereby be 
lessened. 72 
The Brown Shoe Company lawyers basically repeated this 
argument in their Brief for Appellant, arguing that "it is not possible 
harm to a particular competitor, but probable harm to competition, 
which is criticaL,,73 
Interestingly, the United States' reply brief in Brown Shoe never 
directly addressed the "competition, not competitors" language cited 
by Brown Shoe Company. 74 Instead, the United States argued that 
the district court "did not concern itself with the effect of the merger 
upon any particular competitors of Brown and Kinney to the 
exclusion of others of the same class.,,75 The United States then 
observed that: 
[I]f appellant's point is that the judge's analysis of the 
merger is deficient because he did not analyze its immediate 
impact upon the other large integrated manufacturer-
retailers . . . the short answer is that . . . the elimination of 
small competitors and the concentration of an industry into 
the hands of a few large concerns as a result of stock or 
asset acquisitions was exactly what Congress intended to 
prevent.76 
Given the lack of compelling judicial precedent or meaningful 
legislative history before the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe, it is not 
surprising that the majority opinion did not cite any specific authority 
( other than the broad phrase "the legislative history") the two times it 
used the phrase "competition, not competitors".77 Moreover, since it 
72. Brief in Opposition to Motion to Affinn at 11-12, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 
(1962) (No.4), 1960 WL 98806 at *11-12. 
73. Brief for Appellant at 116, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (No.4), 1961 WL 
10 1889 at * 116 (emphasis omitted). Again, the sole support cited for the argument 
was the previously quoted language from the Commission's decision in A. G. 
Spalding & Bros. ld. 
74. See Brief for the United States, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (No.4), 1961 
WL 101890. 
75. ld. at *94-95. 
76. ld. at *95. 
77. See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294. As noted by Commissioner Kovacic, the Court 
first used the phrase in Brown Shoe Co. when it observed: "Taken as a whole, the 
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used the phrase in a strongly protectionist passage, it is impossible to 
read the unanimous Court as prescribing the complete and utter 
indifference to (and even disdain for) competitors that the mantra 
now connotes.78 Indeed, "the Court dismissed the view that 
solicitude for the fate of individual ftrms should play no role--or 
even merely a minor role-in antitrust decision-making.,,79 
Furthermore, in referencing "the Act," it was clear that the Court 
was discussing Section 7 of the Clayton Act and not the Sherman Act 
or the antitrust laws as a whole. 80 And there is little question that the 
1950 Amendments to the Clayton Act resulted from a consensus that 
it was time to stem what was considered to be a frightening new 
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of 
competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that 
such combinations may tend to lessen competition." Kovacic, supra note 7, at 58 
n.196 (quoting Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 320). 
Later in the opinion, the Court used the phrase in discussing the importance of 
promoting competition through "the protection of viable, small, locally-owned 
businesses" : 
A third significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a large 
national chain which is integrated with a manufacturing operation. 
The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating 
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the 
manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own 
brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers. 
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain 
operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not 
rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores 
may be adversely affected. It is competition, not competitors, 
which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' 
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, 
small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that 
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved 
these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We 
must give effect to that decision. 
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344. 
78. History and Law Professor Tony A. Freyer has chronicled the Court's Brown Shoe 
decision drafting process in detail. Freyer, supra note 62, at 369-84. The phrase at 
issue was not a major point of discussion or contention, and "both the activists and 
moderates agreed unanimously upon an expansive reading of the Clayton Act's 
section 7, overturning a controversial merger." Id at 370. 
79. William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the 
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1413, 1424 (1990). 
80. This reference to "the Act" is in a section of the opinion construing the 1950 
amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 335, 344. 
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growth of economic concentration. 81 Indeed, the Senate Report 
observed that: 
While there may exist many differences of opinion on 
other aspects of the monopoly problem, there is substantial 
agreement that the level of economic concentration is 
extremely high. 
The enactment of the bill will limit further growth of 
monopoly and thereby aid in preserving small business as an 
important competitive factor in the American economy. 82 
Further evidence that the Brown Shoe Court was not solely 
focused on the protection of competition comes from the frrestorm of 
criticism from Robert Bork and other Chicago School adherents, who 
argued that the decision protected competitors, not competition. 83 
Ironically, despite the strongly protectionist message of Brown 
Shoe, which has been scorned by ChicagolHarvard academics like 
Robert Bork,84 Brown Shoe's "competition, not competitors" 
language has become the foundation for the ChicagolHarvard 
antitrust double helix protecting dominant frrms and monopolies. 85 
81. See id. at 3 I 5; Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and 
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226,234-36 (1960); Horton, supra note 57, at 192. 
82. S. REp. No. 81-1775 (1950), reprinted in 2 U.S. Code. Congo Service 4293, 4295 
(1950); see Comment, The Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 46 ILL. L. REv. 
444,445 (1951) ("It may be stated that the purpose of the Amendment's proponents 
was clearly to halt what they considered to be a rising tide of economic 
concentration. "). 
83. See, e.g., Freyer, supra note 62, at 382-84; Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., 
The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138-40, 192, 197-98,201. 
84. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 210 
(1978) (criticizing Brown Shoe as "the worst antitrust essay ever written"); Robert H. 
Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363, 373 
(1965). 
85. Much of the application of the cliche has appeared in the context of erecting antitrust 
injury and standing barriers to efforts by competitors of monopolists or dominant 
firms to pursue Section 2 cases. For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the 
antitrust injury concept, which is beyond the scope of this article, see William H. 
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust 
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989). For several strong 
criticisms of the antitrust injury and standing doctrines as door closing devices to 
thwart private remedies, see John 1. Gibbons, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and 
Politics, 50 L. & CONT. PROBLS. 217,221-22 (1987); s. Sussman, Business Judgment 
vs. Antitrust Justice, 76 GEO. L.1. 337,344 (1987). In the words of Judge Gibbons, 
"[i]t is one thing, however, to overrule a demonstrably erroneous substantive 
interpretation of an open-textured statute. It is quite another to attempt to repeal a 
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This stunning mutation and organic metamorphosis from a normative 
statement of opinion in a 1952 Fortune editorial to the bedrock 
foundation of ChicagolHarvard competition philosophy and current 
American antitrust jurisprudence is well-chronicled by Commissioner 
Kovacic. 86 In 1976, fourteen years after Brown Shoe, Harvard 
Professor Phillip Areeda authored a thirteen-page law review 
comment8? addressing two upcoming Supreme Court decisions: 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 88 and United States 
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. 89 As Commissioner Kovacic 
recounts, Professor Areeda's article selectively quoted the Brown 
Shoe "competition, not competitors" language, and sought to "recast 
the philosophy of Brown Shoe from what previously had been seen to 
be a position of acute concern for the well-being of individual fIrms 
to a position of indifference to their fate.,,9o 
The rest is history. As aptly noted by Commissioner Kovacic, 
"[t]he Supreme Court in Brunswick replicated the subtle, significant 
reinterpretation of Brown Shoe that Areeda had undertaken in his law 
review comment.,,91 Worse yet, selectively citing only the fIrst 
"competition, not competitors" phrase from Brown Shoe, and no 
other support, the Supreme Court ascribed the phrase not to Section 7 
of the Clayton Act, but to the antitrust laws generally!92 Suddenly, 
the antitrust laws as a whole protected only competition, not 
competitors.93 From such a thin evolutionary mutation, a judicial 
counterrevolution metastasized. 94 
Today, many of the most reasonable commentators and enforcers 
seem to be seduced by the Chicago/Harvard rhetoric that by 
justifying monopolies and dominant fIrms, one strikes a blow for 
statute by the judicial invention of procedural barriers to its enforcement." Gibbons, 
supra, at 222. 
86. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 71-73; Kovacic, supra note 79, at 1415. 
87. Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv. 
1127 (1976). 
88. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
89. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
90. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56,58. 
91. Id. at 59. 
92. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488; Kovacic, supra note 7, at 56-58. 
93. See BORK, supra note 84, at 203-04. Robert Bork characterized the protection of 
small business as an "ancient and disreputable" theory of antitrust. Id. at 203. 
94. For a discussion of "[t]he powerful impact upon private antitrust litigation of the 
doctrine of Brunswick," see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 59 n.200; Joseph P. Bauer, The 
Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury 
and Standing, 62 U. PIrro L. REv. 437 (2001). 
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economic efficiencies and free markets. 95 Meanwhile, federal courts 
never seem to tire of citing Brown Shoe and Brunswick for the broad 
proposition that the antitrust laws were "enacted to protect 
competition, not competitors.,,96 Ironically, the courts never seem 
concerned that their broad normative statements about "the antitrust 
laws" might be historically inconsistent with the "legislative history 
leading to the enacting of the Sherman Act and [with] the amendment 
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 showing that Congress was 
concerned with the disappearance of small independent entrepreneurs 
and their displacement by massive corporations.,,97 As is well-
chronicled by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, the legislative history 
of the Sherman Act strongly suggests that "everyone agreed that 
competitors should be entitled to sue," and that "[a]lthough the 
drafters of the Sherman Act were concerned about injury to 
consumers, they were at least as concerned with various kinds of 
injury to competitors.,,98 As Professor Hovenkamp concluded: 
"Competitors were the principal protected class of the Sherman 
Act.,,99 
95. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 59, 67, 70-73, 80; Robert F. Pitofsky, The Political 
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1058 (1979). No serious commentator, 
including this author, contends that inefficient small businesses should be protected 
against the rigors of fair competition. But predatory conduct by monopolists and 
dominant firms is a much different matter. Professor Pitofsky presents an objective 
view of the debate and concludes: 
Such considerations as the fear that excessive concentration of 
economic power will foster antidemocratic political pressures, the 
desire to reduce the range of private discretion by a few in order 
to enhance individual freedom, and the fear that increased 
governmental intrusion will become necessary if the economy is 
dominated by the few, can and should be feasibly incorporated 
into the antitrust equation. 
Id. at 1075. 
96. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007); 
Atlanta Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990); Warrior 
Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 2010); 
Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 76 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Jebaco, Inc. v. Harrah's Operating Co., 587 F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2009); Reudy v. 
Clear Channel Outdoors, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Wood v. 
Archbold Med. Ctr, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1364-65 (M.D. Ga. 2010); Fido's 
Fences, Inc. v. Canine Fence Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
97. Pitofsky, supra note 95, at 1058-59; see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 80-81. 
98. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 23-24 
(1989). 
99. Jd. at 29. Professor Hovenkamp included detailed summaries of the Sherman Act's 
legislative history expressing "concern with competitor injuries." Id. at 44-46; see 
also Andreas Koutsoudakis, Antitrust More Than a Century After Sherman: Why 
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The courts also do not explain their views in light of the 1936 
passage of the Robinson-Patman Aceoo and the continued 
congressional refusals to repeal it. 101 As noted by Professor Andrew 
I. Gavil in Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, "concern for the fate 
of individual 'competitors' is unambiguous, albeit on the assumption 
that as goes the fate of competitors, so goes the fate of 
competition.,,102 Is it really so hard to believe that the antitrust laws' 
framers recognized that competition and competitors had to be 
protected against unfair and predatory conduct by monopolies and 
dominant firms?103 
Another point that seems to get lost in the obsessive deference to 
the "competition, not competitors" cliche is that Professor Areeda 
never condoned "anticompetitive activity" by dominant fIrms, 104 
although he came perilously close to blessing anticompetitive 
acquisitions. 105 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Cargill, Inc. v. 
Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More Than Economically Efficient 
Mergers, 34 U. DAYTON L. REv. 223, 230 (2009) ("[P]rotecting competitors is one 
main purpose for which Congress enacted antitrust legislation."). 
100. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 13, 21a (1936). The Robinson-Patman Act 
currently is the principal federal statute directed at price discrimination. A detailed 
discussion of the Act's six basic provisions is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, the first provision generally "prohibits a seller from discriminating in price 
between different buyers when the discrimination adversely affects competition." The 
second provision then "establishes an affirmative defense if the discrimination arises 
from meeting competition." ANTITRUST LA W DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 483. 
101. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 53 (2011) ("Congress, confident in the virtue of 
its intent and responding to the continuing claims by smaller businesses that they need 
protection from the economic power of larger businesses, has steadfastly refused to 
amend or abolish the law. "). 
1 02. Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt: 
To Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.1. 1057, 1118 (1999); see also FTC v. Nat'l Lead 
Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957) (holding that Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act 
"protect[s] competitors in individual transactions"). 
103. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from the Chaff, 86 
YALE L.J. 974, 981 (1977) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976» ("[I]f the courts have strayed beyond the bounds of 
the efficiency criterion [the Chicago/Harvard philosophy] considers so important, and 
if this is not what Congress wants, one wonders why Congress has not intervened."). 
104. Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv. 
1127, 1134 (1976). In a 1976 law review article, Professor Areeda expressly stated 
that "as long as there is no anti competitive injury, the fact of injury to a competitor is 
not a concern of the antitrust laws." Id 
105. See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 24-29 (1978) ("The arbitrary 
preservation of a few firms here or there cannot contribute significantly to the 
dispersion of power or to the protection of political democracy."). 
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Monfort of Colorado, went out of its way to note that "Brunswick 
ho Ids that the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small 
businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but 
only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the 
antitrust laws. ,,106 
Even if the cliche that the "antitrust laws protect competition, not 
competitors" had more historical or legislative support than the 
flimsy reed it was built upon, should we further leverage the mantra 
to essentially immunize dominant firms and monopolies from 
Sherman Act Section 2 liability or greatly decrease the reach of 
Clayton Act Section 7? A small but growing number of 
commentators believe that the answer is no.107 For example, Michael 
Ferrill, Leslie Hyman, and Caleb Rackley argue that "there can be no 
competition without competitors, and it often is the case that a 
competitor is the market participant most likely to recognize and have 
the incentive to challenge conduct that threatens the competitive 
process.,,108 As is discussed in Sections Band C below, evolutionary 
theory supports these critics' position. 
106. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) (emphasis added). 
107. See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 
127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076, 1076 (1979) ("I would not yield .. to the dogma that the 
antitrust laws protect 'competition not competitors,' because the goals of justice and 
the antitrust laws sometimes demand protection of competitors."). Schwartz further 
argued that we should amend the phrase to include "unless individual competitors 
must be protected in the interests of preserving competition." Id. at 1078; see also 
John 1. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of 
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the 
Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1126 nA (1987) ("The 
cliche implicitly asserts that one can have competition without competitors, contains 
no definition of . competition, ' and is frequently used to deny the congressionally 
defined goals of antitrust policy in favor of the narrow goals assumed by the 
neoclassical model."); Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle 
Assessing Conglomerate Mergers Across the Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 
469,498 (2002) ("Where competitors are squeezed out, marginalized or driven out of 
the market, they cannot oppose any credible competitive constraint to the dominant 
merged firms."); Bryce 1. Jones, Maximum Vertical Price Fixing: Making the Rule 
"Right ", 17 MIDWEST L. REv. 69, 83 (2000) (criticizing the quote "that antitrust is 
designed to protect competition, not competitors"). 
108. A. Michael Ferrill et ai., Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 62 SMU L. REv. 855, 
875 (2009). The authors add: 
Brunswick does not imply a necessary conflict between the 
goals of protecting competition and protecting competitors, but 
rather instructs antitrust courts to be alert to the possibility that 
such a conflict may be present in individual cases. Nonetheless, it 
has become fashionable for antitrust cognoscenti to single out for 
disapprobation antitrust claims brought by a competitor of the 
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B. Increasing Variation and Diversity Are Natural States 
This author previously has discussed in detail why evolutionary 
theory has much to teach us about antitrust regulation in our complex, 
free-market economy. 109 Indeed, "[e]conomists have long been 
fascinated by evolutionary and biological competition theories." 110 
Evolutionary biology has a great deal to offer us concerning the 
importance of variation, diversity, and complexity in competitive 
economic systems. III 
Increasing variation, diversity, and complexity are natural states. 112 
"[NJatural selection requires variation in order to effect change." 113 
defendant. Antitrust scholars of a certain disposition argue that 
competitors should be foreclosed from bringing antitrust claims, 
while others draw upon the same scholarship to argue that the 
private antitrust remedy be abolished. And then there are those 
who take laissez faire theology to its logical conclusion, insisting 
that the antitrust laws be repealed altogether. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Edward T. Swaine, "Competition, Not Competitors, " 
Nor Canards: Ways o/Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J.INT'L. ECON. L. 597, 
625 (2002) ("At the same time, competitors may provide probative information that 
consumers lack the incentive or ability to obtain, or that otherwise would be 
prohibitively difficult for the agency to obtain on its own."). But see POSNER. supra 
note 3, at 280-82 (advocating that the states be stripped of their authority to bring 
antitrust suits save in defense of their own proprietary interests, in part because "they 
are excessively influenced by interest groups that may represent a potential antitrust 
defendant's competitors"). 
109. See Horton, supra note 12, at 469-71, 477-84; Horton, Competition or Monopoly?, 
supra note 22, at 197-201. 
110. Horton, supra note 12, at 477; see also ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: 
EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 187 (2006) 
("Businesspeople, journalists, and academics all gravitate quite naturally to using 
images of ecosystems and evolution when they speak about the economy. "). 
111. See BERT HOLLDOBLER & EDWARD O. WILSON, THE ANTS 395 (1990) (observing that 
intense head-to-head competition in natural ecosystems results in "the diversification 
of closely related species occupying the same locality"); GEERAT 1. VERMEIJ, NATURE: 
AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 3-4 (2009) ("[T]he human species and the human economy 
do not differ fundamentally from units encountered in the rest of the biosphere."); id. 
at 170 ("[E]conomic spatial divisions of the world, whether they be forests and fields 
of nature or the nations of human civilization, result from competition and the 
responses of living things to it."). 
112. DANIEL W. MCSHEA & ROBERT N. BRANDON, BIOLOGY'S FIRST LAW: THE TENDENCY 
FOR DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY TO INCREASE IN EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS 3 (20l0); 
see also WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, NATURAL ETHICAL FACTS: EVOLUTION, 
CONNECTIONISM, AND MORAL COGNITION 150 (2003) ("[V]ariation among population 
of species members is something to be expected and something that modem synthesis 
successfully explains. "). 
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At all biological levels, long-tenn health and stability are augmented 
by variation,114 which is the essence of diversity. 115 Healthy species 
therefore consist "not of solely the fittest genome but instead of a 
distribution of genomes in a mutation-selection balance.,,116 Living 
ecosystems therefore "are organized for functions that at least 
incidentally maintain diversity and productivity .... "117 Biological 
studies increasingly show that variation within species and 
populations is both common and adaptive. 118 The "long-tenn value" 
of diversity is coming to be understood as more than political 
correctness. 119 Instead, it is part of a long-tenn adaptability and 
survivability portfolio. l2O Indeed, ecological diversity is viewed as a 
"yardstick of biological success."l2l 
The astonishing array of natural diversity is built around an 
"unexpected and startling degree of order.,,122 Such order is 
inevitable, since nature is limited by a host of physical and chemical 
constraints. 123 One of nature's most fundamental limitations is 
113. Egbert Giles Leigh, Jr., Adaptation, Adaptationism and Optimality, in 
AoAPTATlONISM AND OPTIMALITY 358, 362 (Steven Hecht Orzack & Elliott Sober 
eds., 2001); see also MARTIN A. NOWAK, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS: EXPLORING THE 
EQUATIONS OF LIFE 24 (2006) ("[V]ariability [is] needed for natural selection. If 
variabIlity disappears, then natural selection has nothing upon which to act."). 
114. James E. Lovelock, The Earth as a Living Organism, in BIODIVERSITY 486, 488 
(Edward O. Wilson ed., 1988); Horton, supra note 13, at 488 and citations therein. 
115. MCSHEA & BRANDON, supra note 112, at 26. 
116. NOWAK, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS, supra note 113, at 42. Nowak additionally 
observes that it is possible that the broad distribution of genomes "does not contain 
the fittest genome at all. Hence 'survival of the fittest' is replaced by 'survival of the 
quasispeci.es.'" Id Therefore, "[i]n principle, evolutionary biology can account for 
the amazing diversity and astonishing complexity oflife." Id at 292. 
117. Leigh, supra note 116, at 363 (emphasis omitted). 
118. Kenneth 1. Halama & David N. Reznick Adaptation, Optimality, and the Meaning of 
Phenotypic Variation in Natural Populations, in AoAPTATlONISM, supra note 116, at 
242,242-43,263-64. 
119. JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, THE GENIAL GENE: DECONSTRUCTING DARWINIAN SELFISHNESS 
84 (2009). 
120. Id. 
121. MICHAEL RUSE, DARWINISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 199 (2006) (quoting KARL J. 
NIKLAS, THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY OF PLANTS 204-05 (1997». 
122. BRIAN GOODWIN, How THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
COMPLEXITY 117 (1994). For example, "[ d]espite the profusion of leaf shapes in 
higher plants, there are basically only three ways in which leaves are arranged on a 
stem." Id Thus, "it appears that the different patterns are not fixed characteristics of 
different species but are a set of alternative states available to the leaf-generating 
process in the meristem." Id at 119. 
123. Id at 135-42. Biologist Brian Goodwin further hypothesizes that "what we see in 
evolution may be primarily an emergence of states generic to the dynamics of living 
systems." Id. at 186. 
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physical size. "For every type of animal there is a most convenient 
size, and a large change in size inevitably carries with it a change of 
form.,,124 The evolution of body forms therefore seems to follow 
"some fairly predictable rules common to all forms of life .... ,,125 
The Chicago/Harvard notion of ever-increasing economies of 
scale driven by increases in size l26 is inconsistent with nature. In 
nature, as organisms get larger and larger, they face a host of natural 
straitjackets that "impose considerable anatomical and physiological 
diseconomies of scale on their large-bodied carriers.,,127 Thus, as 
previously noted, giantism is not a natural state. 
Nor is nature generally optimal or efficient in the classical 
economic sense preached by the Chicago/Harvard proponents. 128 
"[NJature and evolution consistently build seemingly inefficient 
structural, physiological, and chemical redundancies into living 
systems at all levels as a means of ensuring increased flexibility, 
adaptability, and stability.,,129 For example, approximately "ninety-
seven per cent of our genome does not consist of true genes at all. It 
consists of a menagerie of strange entities ... collectively known as 
'junk DNA' .... ,,130 This is not as surprising as it may seem because 
biological systems are essentially "information-processing 
machines,,,131 and "[iJnformation and redundancy are 
complementary .... "132 Indeed, redundancies and loosely connected 
124. J. B. S. Haldane, On Being the Right Size, In THE OXFORD BOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE 
WRITING 53, 54 (Richard Dawkins ed., 2008). Haldane adds that "it is easy to show 
that a hare could not be as large as a hippopotamus, or a whale as small as a herring." 
ld. at 54. Similar limitations exist for organs. For example, "the eye is a rather 
inefficient organ until it reaches a large size." ld. at 58. 
125. HAIM OFEK, SECOND NATURE: ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF HUMAN EVOLUTION 91 (20001). 
Discussing economies of scale related to size, Ofek adds that "(e]ngineers therefore 
are faced with a delicate balancing act between economies of scale in surface or 
diseconomies of scale in weight or, more fundamentally, between an invariable law of 
solid geometry and the law of gravity." ld. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15 (discussing the Chicago/Harvard argument 
that monopolies efficiently weed out weaker firms and allow the economy to grow). 
127. OFEK, supra note 125, at 92. 
128. See, e.g., RUSE, DARWINISM, supra note 121, at 136-39. 
129. Horton, supra note 12, at 490 (footnote omitted) (citing Joseph Farrell, Complexity, 
Diversity, and Antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 165, 167-68 (2006)). 
130. MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 123-24 
(2010); see also Horton, supra note 13, at 490-91 (discussing how junk DNA and 
genetic redundancies help strengthen an organism by promoting adaptability). 
131. Sydney Brenner, Theoretical Biology in the Third Millennium, in MODERN SCIENCE 
WRITING, supra note 9, at 40,44. 
132. SEIFE, supra note 9, at 13. Seife adds: 
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interdependencies help avoid complexity catastrophes if one part of a 
system breaks down or is injured. 133 
Ecological and genetic redundancies also provide a cornucopia of 
variety for natural selection to act upon 134 in producing new or 
different fitness adaptations. 135 As noted by economist Haim Ofek, 
"[B]iological arms races, as exemplified by the stature of forest trees 
(and, arguably, by the human brain) are bound to reveal new 
unintended applications which can be put to good use.,,136 Indeed, "a 
rich metabolism of diverse reactions [is a] basic characteristic of 
living systems.,,13? In other words, nature is masterful at exploiting 
diversity and variety to create new innovations. 
Through both instinctual and experiential learning, humans have 
come to make diversity "the central organizing principle of human 
consumption." 138 Our human economies mimic nature in requiring 
high levels of diversity for long-term health and stability.139 Thus, a 
Computer scientists are well aware of the redundancy ina 
stream of bits and bytes for two main reasons. The first is error 
correction. Humans make mistakes when entering long strings of 
numbers, so credit cards, serial numbers, bar codes, and numerous 
other numbers are padded with redundancy so that a computer 
will be able to detect whether someone has made a data-entry 
error .... 
. .. English and other human languages [ also] have a great 
deal of redundancy built into them. 
Jd. at 69-70. 
133. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 12, at 491 (citing BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 150-
52). 
134. "[N]atural selection operates on the variation in shapes and sizes and forms of 
organisms created by mutations in their genes .. " Ruse & Travis, Introduction, in 
EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR BILLION YEARS, supra note 9, at x. Of course, "natural 
selection is not the only important evolutionary force." Id. Other forces can include 
genetic drift, sexual selection, and chance. Ptacek & Hankison, The Pattern and 
Process o/Speciation, in EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR BILLION YEARS, supra note 10, 
at 177. 
135. In the words of Matt Ridley, "Welcome to pleiotropy and pluralism." RIDLEY, supra 
note 130, at 66. As Ridley further notes: "[G]enes are messy." Id. 
136. OFEK, supra note 125, at 82. 
137. GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 188; see also MCSHEA & BRANDON, supra note 112, at 
42 ("[S]election works by favoring lineages that are more evolutionarily responsive to 
environmental changes, those that can be modified independently from other lineages, 
freed from the historical constraints that otherwise limit morphological evolution."). 
138. OFEK, supra note 125, at 64. 
139. See GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 230 ("[W]hen all the multiple yields of diverse 
crops, the values and outputs of biological systems, are taken in account, agricultural 
practices based on diversity are more productive, produce higher nutrient value in the 
food than monoculture farming, and are sustainable. And there are countless 
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"key to human health and sheer existence is diversity in food 
intake.,,140 
Similarly, in the economic fields of corporate governance and 
finance, "a diversity oflocal response[s] is a sign of health; ifthere is 
a major crisis, it will be disastrous if the solutions have been uniform 
and universal .... ,,141 Hopefully, we learned that in the wake of the 
recent banking and financial crisis.142 Despite Judge Bork's verbal 
attacks against Justice Brandeis and his alleged "lack of conceptual 
clarity,,,143 perhaps Justice Brandeis had it right all along in theorizing 
that "[t]here are no natural monopolies today in the industrial 
world."I44 Instead, nature favors variety, diversity, and complexity. 145 
other instances that contrast the monoculture mentality of 'scientific' Western 
Agriculture with the robust, supportive, diverse, and sustainable qualities of 
traditional agroforestry. "); Horton, supra note I 2, at 489. 
140. OFEK, supra note 125, at 63. For example, "[t]hough the most conspicuous, scurvy is 
only one of a long list of nutritional disorders associated with lack of diversity in food 
consumption." Id 
141. MARC GOERGEN ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 79 
(2010). The authors add that "[i]f there is local diversity, there are multiple 
microstrategies already tried out and some of them are likely to fit the new 
environmental conditions." Id; see also Joseph Farrell, Complexity, Diversity, and 
Antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 165, 167-68 (2006) (discussing benefits of "multiple 
approaches" by "multiple organizations" to economic issues); Grant Miles et aI., 
Industry Variety and Performance, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163, 166-72 (1993) 
(discussing a study finding a positive correlation between industry variety and 
performance); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
551,613 (2012) ("A low to moderately concentrated industry with diverse competitors 
can offer greater benefits ... than a highly concentrated industry. "). 
142. See "Too Big to Fail? ": The Role of Antltrust Law in Government-Funded 
Consolidation in the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & 
Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Congo 10 (2009) 
(statement of Albert A. Foer, PreSident, Am. Antitrust Inst.) (discussing how failures 
of large organizations deeply embedded in the economy cause huge ripple effects 
throughout the system); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND 
THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO 
FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
143. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 84, at 42. 
144. Louis D. Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?, in THE CURSE OF 
BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 104, 105 (Osmond K. 
Frankel ed., 1934); see also Horton, supra note 12, at 486, n.78; Horton, supra note 
22, at 205-13. 
145. More and more economists are coming to accept that competitive economic diversity 
provides substantial economic innovation and variety benefits. See WALTER ADAMS 
& JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN 
THE AMERlCAN ECONOMY 59-62 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing economic studies showing 
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C. When Diversity and Complexity Are Diminishing, We Should 
Look for Outside Constraints, Including Predatory Behavior by 
Dominant Firms and Anticompetitive Mergers 
Increasing variety, diversity, and complexity are natural. So why 
are monopolies and dominant fIrms so prevalent?146 Duke University 
Professors McShea and Brandon counsel that when diversity and 
complexity are diminishing rather than increasing, we should look for 
unnatural outside limits or constraints being imposed upon the 
system. 147 They further argue that most of the possible outside 
factors such as "limits on heredity" and "selection against diversity" 
probably do not limit diversity much. 148 "[DJeath and extinction," on 
the other hand "have the potential to be serious drains on 
diversity." 149 Could this explain the unremitting efforts of 
monopolists and dominant fIrms to "try to eliminate the competition 
from their own ranks, sometimes to the point of cut-throat price 
wars,,,ISO or the temptations to acquire aggressive competitors? 
The Chicago/Harvard antitrust philosophy counsels that predatory 
behavior is not to be feared because it allegedly rarely occurs. lSI 
Judge Easterbrook, for example, has stated, without citation or 
meaningful legal support, that a predator "is highly sensitive to its 
costs of doing business; it calculates how much sacrifIce it needs to 
how high economic concentration retards technological innovation and development); 
Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity Approach, in UNIQUE 
VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION CREATING UNIQUE VALUE 161-65 
(Charles D. Weller et al. eds., 2004); MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 662-69 (1990); Farrell, supra note 141, at 167-68. 
146. See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 145, at 124 ("[W]hile the shape of the monopoly 
problem has changed, the nature of the problem persists."); BARRY C. LYNN, 
CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 
16 (2010) ('''We are in an age of monopolies."') (quoting Jim Cramer, MSNBC, Feb. 
15, 2006); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE 
DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 82 (2005) (discussing the "rapidly accelerating trend to 
concentration" as a result of a "lenient policy on mergers"). 
147. See MCSHEA & BRANDON, supra note 112, at 29. 
148. ld. at 29-33. 
149. Jd. at 32. McShea and Brandon further note that "[i]n extreme cases, reductions in 
diversity due to extinction have been dramatic." ld. 
ISO. OFEK, supra note 125, at 139. 
lSI. See DAVIDSON, supra note I, at 85 (observing that, for the Chicago School, 
"[p Jredation is not plausible because theory [allegedly] has shown that it is unlikely to 
occur"); Eleanor Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Retrospective and Prospective: Where 
Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS 
SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL POLICY 73, 74 
(Harry First et al. eds., 1991). 
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make (and could bear), and uses that as the basis of its prices.,,152 
Moreover, consumers allegedly benefit from predatory conduct, such 
as predatory pricing, because "[ t ]he success of any predatory scheme 
depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to 
recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain,,,153 
and "[p ]ersistent entry and expansion by other firms at the same time 
[generally] ensures that recoupment cannot occur.,,154 
Such conclusory economic cliches rationalizing and encouraging 
predatory conduce55 completely fail to account for the simple point 
that throughout our evolutionary history, humans' most deadly 
predators have been other human beings.156 It is part of our 
152. A. A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
153. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). 
154. A. A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1403. 
155. Such conclusions seem tantamount to arguing that we should not worry about an 
opposing baseball pitcher purposely throwing at a player's head because the pitcher 
knows that even if he knocks that player out of the game, someone will come off the 
bench and replace him. Meanwhile, the fans will ultimately benefit from the super 
aggressive competition. Similarly, the National Football League should stop worrying 
about vicious hits that injure or cripple players because spectators will benefit from 
the increased aggressiveness. 
The Chicago/Harvard school may argue that these examples involve successful 
predation, as opposed to most economic predation, which generally is unsuccessful 
and therefore unprofitable. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595; A. A. Poultry Farms, 881 
F.2d at 1401. 
How exactly does a predator know, however, whether its vicious predation will be 
unsuccessful in the long-term, especially when it can enjoy the short-term benefits and 
satisfaction of knowing it successfully destroyed a hated competitor? And why do not 
all criminals carefully calculate the economic benefits versus potential losses before 
engaging in vicious and destructive aggression? Recently deceased antitrust giant 
Alfred E. Kahn observed that "[t]he burden surely rests on the critics of the antitrust 
laws to demonstrate that those predatory or collusive actions which the law attacks are 
indeed requisite to good performance. This is something for the most part they have 
failed to do." Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, in MONOPOLY POWER 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 54, at 169, 178. Economist Oliver 
Williamson similarly has argued that "[e]fforts to derogate strategic behavior have 
been overdone," and we need to "taken strategic behavior in all its forms 
seriously." Williamson, supra note 38, at 236-37. 
156. PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
LIFE 8 (2010); see also DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 86 (,,[T]he notion that businesses 
do not engage in predatory pricing or predation in general is silly and is a conclusion 
that could only be deduced from theory, not from experience or observation of life. It 
is too obvious and too trite to dwell on the fact that aggressive behavior is often an 
effective means of eliminating and deterring competitors, whether one is talking about 
stags fighting over a doe, bullies dominating a schoolyard, or monopolists or cartels 
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evolutionary nature to be "strongly disposed against unrelated 
individuals in the appropriate circumstances,,157-some would argue 
to the point that we have an "innate murderousness." 158 Economist 
Paul Seabright, for example, points to the "sobering" historical record 
showing that ''where there are no institutional restraints on it, 
systematic killing of unrelated individuals is so common among 
human beings that, awful though it is, it cannot be described as 
exceptional, pathological, or disturbed." 159 Economist Michael 
Shermer attributes "evil to our dual dispositional nature and the fact 
that in addition to being trusting, cooperative, and altruistic, we are 
also distrusting, competitive, and selfish .... "160 
Given our innate predatory and aggressive instincts, not to 
mention the history of war, is it really so hard to believe that 
businesses might be inclined to engage in unfair and predatory 
conduct designed to eliminate a competitor? "Military strategists 
have long known that a disparity in strength between rivals-and 
especially a growing disparity in strength-is the most important 
single reason to expect an outbreak of hostilities.,,161 Thus, our 
propensity to engage in cooperative commercial activity "has always 
coexisted with a rival temptation to take, bully, and extort.,,162 Could 
that be one reason why hostile takeovers are so common even though 
evidence "suggests that the shareholders of bidders involved in 
hostile takeovers feel that such transactions destroy shareholder 
wealth. [And] there is little evidence ... of the disciplining role of 
hostile takeoversT163 
disciplining price cutters."); Horton, supra note 12, at 509 (discussing humans' innate 
biological propensities for potential viciousness, aggression, and irrationality that 
constitute our darker side). 
157. SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 59. 
158. Id. at 60. 
159. Id. at 61. 
160. MICHAEL SHERMER, THE MIND OF THE MARKET: COMPASSIONATE APES, COMPETITIVE 
HUMANS, AND OTHER TALES FROM EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 184 (2008). 
161. SEABRIGHT, supra note 159, at 280. 
162. Id. at 288. Professor Seabright characterizes this as "the fragility of the commercial 
motive in the face of more brutal temptations." Id 
163. GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 76-77. The Chicago/Harvard philosophy, on the 
other hand, is that promoting mergers is "the way markets regulate inefficient 
corporate managers." DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 71. Indeed, Chicago School 
advocate Michael Jensen went so far as to argue that "the benefits of mergers was to 
discipline acquiring firms by stripping them of inefficiently used money, free cash 
flow and credit by payments to the shareholders of the acquired firm. Thereafter, the 
acquiring firm, stripped of the acquisition resources, would be more subject to market 
resources." Id at 72. 
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Unfortunately, today's laissez-faire business environment, which 
is a key component of the Chicago/Harvard antitrust philosophy, 
helps foster an "us versus them" mentality that plays into our 
evolutionary heritage of "violence between groups, whose individuals 
cooperate among themselves to inflict violence more lethally and 
cruelly than they ever could do on their own." 164 Therefore, we 
should not be shocked that business environments can shape and 
promote managerial agents who are potential agents of corruption, 
and predatory attacks against competitors. 165 In the words of Michael 
Shermer: 
When order breaks down, when the rules are no longer 
enforced, when the normal institutional brakes on evil are 
lifted, evil is facilitated through the contagious excitement 
of the group's actions, through the unchecked momentum of 
the smaller bad steps that came before, and ultimately 
permission for evil is granted by the system at large. 166 
This is especially likely when corporations are interested in short-
term profits and market shares. 167 
It is time, therefore, to start taking seriously again the notion that 
the destruction of competitors by dominant-fum predatory conduct 
and aggressive mergers are harmful external constraints on the 
natural growth of economic variation, diversity, and complexity. The 
164. SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 290. 
165. GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 93-94. As added by Philosophy Professor 
William D. Casebeer: "Simply put, your environment counts, and it counts for a lot." 
CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 110. Casebeer goes on to describe "morality as an 
essentially ecological evolutionary phenomenon." Id. 
166. SHERMER, supra note 160, at 213. Shermer additionally observes that "as a social 
primate species we are remarkably susceptible to the wishes of others, especially 
alpha males and those in positions of authority." Jd. And "[b ]ecause we evolved to 
be such social beings, we are hypersensitive to what others think about us, and we are 
strongly motivated to conform to the social norms of our group." Id. at 212. 
Consequently, if the head of a business ''team or group or company has a certain 
ideology [or philosophy, including engaging in predatory conduct], you have to 
follow it to get ahead." Id at 214. "Thus, an environment of moral corporate 
philosophy and leaders establishes a situation that can either accentuate the good 
disposition of employees or bring out the bad." Id at 215. 
167. Marc Goergen et al. argue that "[c]orporations are interested in short-term 
profitability. This is because shareholders are generally interested in short-term 
profitability." GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 42. Unfortunately, the 
ChicagolHarvard antitrust philosophy ignores this in focusing on long-term 
recoupment of short-term losses as being necessary for dominant-firm conduct to be 
predatory. 
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ChicagolHarvard fear of "false pOSItIves in dealing with 
exclusionary-practice claims,,168 completely ignores the risks of lost 
variation, diversity, and complexityl69 and the attendant harms to our 
economic system's health and stability.l7O Unlike the 
ChicagolHarvard theoreticians, biologists have long appreciated that 
competitively induced diversity enhances an ecosystem's overall 
fitness. 171 Increases in overall diversity directly lead to "increased 
ecosystem and organism adaptability, resilience and stability." 172 
168. Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 357-58. 
169. See, e.g., Or1ey C. Ashenfelter, Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, The Price 
Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool 22 
(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17476, 2011), available at 
http://ssm.comlabstract=1857066 ("We observe a large reduction in the number of 
distinct items (stock-keeping units or SKUs) offered to consumers following the 
[Maytag-Whirlpool] acquisition, and this reduction is largest III the clothes washer and 
dryer markets that were the focus of the government's investigation. If the number of 
distinct SKUs are a meaningful measure of product variety, this finding suggests that 
the merger may have resulted in a large, and potentially important, reduction in 
variety."); James E. Lovelock, The Earth as a Living Organism, in BIODIVERSITY, 
supra note 114, at 486, 488 ("[N]ew ecological models demonstrate that as diversity 
increases so does stability and resilience."). But see Michaela Draganska, Michael J. 
Mazzeo & Katja Seim, Beyond Plain Vanilla: Modeling Joint Pricing and Product 
Assortment and Pricing Decisions, QUANTITATIVE MARKETING & ECON., June 2009, at 
105 (discussing papers reaching contrasting conclusions as to whether mergers that 
result in more concentrated markets tend to display more or less product variety post-
merger). 
170. See, e.g., STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING THE SACRED: A NEW VIEW OF SCIENCE, 
REASON, AND RELIGION 151 (2008) ("[A]s data confirm-economic growth is 
positively correlated with economic diversity."); Horton, supra note 12, at 489 ("[I]t 
should not surprise us to find a correlation between economic diversity and overall 
economic growth. "). 
171. For example, in 1859, Charles Darwin "argued that island ecosystems are more 
invasible because their level of competition is too weak to exclude introduced 
species." E. G. Leigh, Jr. et aI., What Do Human Economies, Large Islands, and 
Forest Fragments Reveal About the Factors Limiting Ecosystem Evolution?, 22 J. 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY I, 6 (2009); see also EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF 
LIFE 129-30 (1992) ("[In nature, dominant groups tend to divide [through adaptive 
radiation into multiple species] that adopt different ways of life. [And] dominant 
groups that have diversified to this degree ... are on average better off than those 
composed only of a single species; as a purely incidental effect, highly diversified 
groups have better balanced their investments and will probably persist longer into the 
future."). 
172. Horton, supra note 13, at 488; see also James E. Lovelock, The Earth as a Living 
Organism, in BIODIVERSITY, supra note 114, at 488; Bryan Norton, Commodity, 
Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantification in Valuing Biodiversity, in 
BIODIVERSITY, supra note 117, at 200,203 ("The value of biological diversity is more 
than the sum of its parts."); Ruth Patrick, Biodiversity: Why Is It Important?, in 
BIODIVERSITY II: UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 15, 
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Quite simply, "[t]he more species that live in an ecosystem, the 
higher its productivity and the greater its ability to withstand drought 
and other kinds of environmental stress." 173 
The Chicago/Harvard antitrust philosophy also overlooks the 
short-term temptations for dominant fIrms to take the easy 
competitive way out by knocking out or acquiring competitors rather 
than focusing on developing better products and creating more 
innovations. 174 This is especially troublesome because constant 
innovation and product improvement are critical to our continuing 
economic growth,175 and increasing product quality and innovation is 
a direct result of increasing competition in an environment of diverse 
competitors. 176 
Consequently, we should begin to recognize the importance of 
competitor diversity and variation, and stop relying upon the facile, 
and historically and evolutionarily incorrect statement that it is 
important only to protect "competition, not competitors." There is no 
good reason to allow economically diverse competitors to be 
annihilated by unfair and exclusionary dominant-frrm conduct, or 
17 (MaIjorie L. Reake-Kudla et al. eds., 1997) ("[I]t is easy to understand that 
terrestrial ecosystems are dependent on a high diversity of macro- and microscopic 
organisms if the functioning of the ecosystem is to be efficient."). 
173. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILlENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 294 (1998) 
[hereinafter CONSILlENCE]; see also Horton, supra note 12, at 488 ("On the other 
hand, ecosystems with a 'relative lack of diversity' and variability are inherently 
unstable and subject to invasion by species from outside the ecosystem.") (citing Peter 
M. Vitousek, Diversity and Biological Invasions of Oceanic Islands, in BIODIVERSITY, 
supra note 114, at 181, 184 (discussing why isolated species are more susceptible to 
extinction caused by biological invasions». 
174. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 72-81 (1911) (finding 
Standard Oil guilty of monopolizing the petroleum industry by using its size to 
vertically integrate, acquiring ownership of entities from the oil exploration stage 
through service stations offering their refined products to consumers, which allowed 
Standard Oil to undercut competitors' costs to the point of bankruptcy or a sellout); 
Horton, supra note 12, at 501 ("Unfortunately, history has shown over and over that 
monopolies and dominant firms can and do, behave badly and cannot be trusted."). 
175. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 63-65, 149-53 (discussing importance of small 
firms and individuals to economic innovation and how important innovation is to 
"increased productivity and economic growth"). 
176. Id. at 149-66. See generally BURTON H. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977); 
MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990); Thomas L. 
Friedman, Op-Ed., Start-Ups, Not Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at WK9 
(,"Between 1980 and 2005, virtually all net new jobs created in the U.S. were created 
by firms that were 5 years old or less."') (quoting Robert Litan of the Kauffman 
Foundation, "which specializes in promoting innovation in America"). 
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aggressIve mergers. Instead, we should protect healthy and stable 
competition by guarding competitors against such antitrust violations, 
and by pursuing merger policies that promote and protect variation 
and diversity rather than concentration. 178 
A recent ray of sunshine and hope emerged on August 19, 2010, 
when the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission released comprehensive revisions (''N ew Merger 
Guidelines") to their 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which had 
last been revised in April of 1997.179 One dramatic change is the 
signaling of "a commitment toward more aggressive horizontal 
merger enforcement driven by a renewed emphasis on the Clayton 
Act's incipiency standard.,,180 In addition, "they indicate heightened 
concerns about potential unilateral effects, including exclusionary 
conduct, and impacts on non-price competition such as quality, 
variety, and innovation.,,181 As part of this approach, the New Merger 
Guidelines state in Section 6.4 that the "Agencies may consider 
whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation competition by 
encouraging the merged ftrm to curtail its innovative efforts below 
the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.,,182 "The 
New [Merger] Guidelines add that curtailed innovation could take the 
form of reduced incentives to continue with existing product-
development efforts or the development of new productS.,,183 
177. See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 497, 500 (2009) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 
428 (2d Cir. 1945)); Geerat J. Vermeij, Comparative Economics: Evolution and the 
Modern Economy, 11 1. BIOECONOMICS 105, 128 (2009) ("[P]olicies of [economic] 
concentration are both risky and inconsistent with the lessons from the economies of 
nature."). 
178. See. e.g., CONSILIENCE, supra note 173, at 294 ("Recent experimental studies on 
whole ecosystems support what ecologists have long suspected: The more species that 
live in an ecosystem, the higher its productivity and the greater its ability to withstand 
drought and other kinds of environmental stress."). 
179. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. 
180. Thomas 1. Horton, The New United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Devolution. 
Evolution. or Counterrevolution?, 2 1. EUR. COMPETITION LAW & PRAC. 158, 158 
(2011); U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,supra note 179, at 1,25. 
181. Horton, supra note 180, at 158; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra 
note 179, at 2. 
182. U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 179, § 6.4, at 23. 
183. Horton, supra note 180, at 162; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm To Competition 
Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REv. INDus. ORG. 3, 6-8 (2011) 
(observing that the New Merger Guidelines have concluded that in many instances 
non-dominant firms have greater incentives to innovate, but that acquisition by a 
dominant firm could eliminate these incentives); TiM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE 
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While the New Merger Guidelines offer some hope, a new 
conservative administration could quickly seek to rescind or modify 
them. 184 Furthermore, the New Merger Guidelines "are not law and 
the American courts are not therefore bound to follow or defer to 
them.,,185 Nevertheless, they represent a potential beginning in the 
process of unraveling the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix and 
replacing its fIrst strand with an evolutionarily-based philosophy 
consistent with the antitrust laws' framers' intent. 186 
III. UNRAVELING THE CHICAGO/HARVARD APPROACH TO 
ANTITRUST JURY TRIALS 
A key component of the second strand of the Chicago/Harvard 
antitrust double helix has been an all-out attack against jury trials in 
Section 2 monopolization and attempted monopolization cases. 187 
Professor Donald F. Turner did not mince words in 1987 when he 
argued that "[ t ]here would be signifIcant gains from eliminating jury 
trials in private antitrust actions.,,188 Turner believed that 
"substituting court trials for jury trials would reduce the private and 
public costs of antitrust litigation... [and] facilitate both the 
narrowing of the issues to be put to full trial and the granting of 
summary judgment.,,189 Without citing any support, Professor Turner 
added that "elimination of juries would increase the probability of 
accurate results.,,19o 
RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010) (documenting how innovation in the 
telecommunications industry has come primarily from nondominant and outsider 
firms). 
184. Conservative economist Jerry Hausman, for example, quickly criticized the New 
Merger Guidelines as devolutionary. See Jerry Hausman, 2010 Merger Guidelines: 
Empirical Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2010), http;//www.americanbar. 
org! content! darn! aba/publishing! antitrust_source/Oct 1 0 ]ullSource. 
authcheckdam.pdf. 
185. Horton, New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 183, at 163; see, e.g., New 
York v. Group Health, Inc., No. 06-Civ. 13122, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60196, at 
*16-19 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010) (rejecting efforts by antitrust plaintiff to amend its 
complaint to include the upper pricing pressure test, which appears in the New Merger 
Guidelines). 
186. See supra Part II. 
187. See DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 79, 85-87 (discussing how Chicago School antitrust 
theories have "eliminated the fact finding role of the jury"); Kovacic, supra note 7, at 
51-52. 
188. Turner, supra note 20, at 812. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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Professor Turner recognized that there was a slight "problem" 
with his anti-democratic proposal: the Seventh Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 191 He therefore recommended "a 
congressional statute eliminating jury trial of private antitrust 
actions.,,192 
Congress, of course, never seriously took up Professor Turner's 
anti-democratic suggestion to try to override the Seventh Amendment 
in antitrust cases. Nevertheless, academic and judicial disciples of 
the ChicagolHarvard antitrust philosophy have pressed forward and 
implemented Professor Turner's recommendation that "[s]o long as 
private antitrust actions are triable to juries, it is important that the 
bases for summary judgment be expanded .... ,,193 Their success has 
nearly eliminated the Seventh Amendment's protections in 
monopolization cases today.194 As any seasoned antitrust lawyer can 
tell you today, procuring a Section 2 plaintiff s jury verdict and 
seeing it successfully through the appeals process is akin to getting "a 
camel to go through the eye of a needle .... "195 
191. Id. at 813. The Amendment states in part, "In Suits at common law, where the value 
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Supreme Court additionally expanded the 
Seventh Amendment's coverage to actions enforcing statutory rights "if the statute 
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary 
courts of law." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,194 (1974). 
192. Turner, supra note 22, at 814. 
193. Id. Professor Turner cited aspiration ally to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S. Ct. 2505 
(1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). 
194. See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST 
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 672, 
699-700 (2d ed. 2008) (Observing that "[t]ogether, Matsushita and Brooke Group 
have proven to be formidable hurdles to the successful prosecution of predatory 
pricing cases. Since Matsushita was decided in 1986, no plaintiff, including the 
Department of Justice, has succeeded in satisfying the two prong 'below cost + 
recoupment' standard." [Furthermore, "no plaintiff, public or private, has prevailed in 
a case controlled by Brooke Group. In contrast, the few recent cases in which 
plaintiffs have prevailed under Section 2, cases like LePage's and Microsoft [non-
jury], the Court relied on Aspen Skiing dominant firm defendants see in Brooke 
Group a deferential standard that provides them with significant discretion to structure 
their primary competitive conduct free from any serious threat of antitrust liability. "). 
195. Mark 10:25 (King James); see Kovacic, supra note 7, at 73-80, for an excellent 
analysis of how "assumptions about the asserted dangers of overdeterrence from 
private enforcement in the United States ought not be accepted as a matter of faith and 
ought to be tested vigorously in light of modern experience and empirical study." Id 
at 75 (citing Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. 
REv. 651 (2006)). 
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A key lynchpin of the Chicago/Harvard school's practical 
negation of plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment rights in antitrust cases 
has been a flank attack designed to nullify and eliminate the use of 
intent evidence in Section 2 cases. ]96 In a 1987 California Law 
Review article complementary to Professor Turner's, Professor 
Areeda argued that even "accepted uses of intention can ultimately 
mislead courts and juries. ,,]97 Areeda added: "[E]vidence of intention 
is often extremely prejudicial because the language of businessmen in 
the heat of competitive battle may sound predatory in the legal calm 
of the courtroom.,,]98 He then concluded that allowing jurors to rely 
on intent evidence "can interfere with efficient operation of business 
enterprises and that, by creating enormous uncertainty, burdens a 
frrm and the legal system with unnecessary costS.,,]99 
Professor Areeda's and Turner's flank attack on the use of intent 
evidence in Section 2 cases has succeeded. Following the second 
strand of the Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix, "the focus of 
recent cases has been on the propriety of the monopolist's conduct, 
not its subjective desire to win the competitive battle.,,20o Over and 
over, the courts have used forgiving language to rationalize and 
neuter strong evidence of dominant firms' predatory intent toward 
competitors.20] For example, in A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre 
196. See Kovacic, supra note 7, at 53. 
197. Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the 
Future, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 959,963 (1987). 
198. Id.; see also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,232 (1st Cir. 
1983) ("'[I]ntent to hann' without more offers too vague a standard in a world where 
executives may think no further than 'Let's get more business' .... "). Tellingly, the 
First Circuit never explained how its logic that executives may think only in the short-
tenn squares with the rationale that business predators carefully and rationally 
calculate the long-tenn implications of their aggressive conduct. See id. at 230-36. 
199. Areeda, supra note 197, at 965; see also Kovacic, supra note 7, at 53. The Supreme 
Court has "relied extensively" on Areeda-Turner in analyzing predatory pricing 
allegations. Id. at 45-46 n.139. 
200. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 243. 
201. See, e.g., Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 2000). While 
monopoly power is not unlawful without the element of predatory intent, "[b]y intent, 
we do not mean intent to obtain a monopoly or to capture an ongoing increase in 
market share. This of course IS the aim of every business endeavor." Id.; see also 
Int'l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1394-96 (8th Cir. 1993); Ocean 
State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield ofR.!., 883 F.2d 1101, 
1113 (l st Cir. 1989) ("[T]he desire to crush a competitor, standing alone, is 
insufficient to make out a violation of the antitrust laws."); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. 
Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986) ("'[I]ntent to hann rivals' 
is not a useful standard in antitrust."); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. 
Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[I]f conduct is not objectively 
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Farms, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), Judge Frank Easterbrook and 
the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court's overturning of plaintiff 
egg producing and processing competitors' Section 2 jury verdict. 
Judge Easterbrook stated that even though overwhelming evidence of 
predatory intent "impressed the jury,,,202 it had no real probative value 
under Matsushita203 or Professor Areeda's and Turner's 
recommendations. 204 
It is time to unravel and discard the philosophical assumptions of 
the second Chicago/Harvard antitrust helix strand dedicated to 
keeping Section 2 antitrust cases away from jurors by glorifying 
judges' alleged abilities to better understand and apply so-called 
objective economic theory while ignoring evidence of actual intent. 
Applying an evolutionary approach, we should rely upon the base 
pairs A-T, which will stand for reviving antitrust jury trials. The new 
A-T base pairs will protect our Seventh Amendment jury trial rights 
anti competitive the fact that it was motivated by hostility to competitors. . 1S 
irrelevant. "). 
202. A. A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989). 
203. Id. at 1401 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
595(1986». Judge Easterbrook explained: 
Reference to intent could not help the court determine whether 
recoupment is possible, and unless recoupment is possible, and 
unless recoupment lies in stone even the most vicious intent is 
harmless to the competitive system. 
Almost all evidence bearing on 'intent' tends to show both 
greed-driven desire to succeed and glee at a rival's 
predicament.. . [A] desire to extinguish one's rivals is entirely 
consistent with, often is the motive behind competition. 
[S]tatements of this sort readily may be misunderstood by lawyers 
and jurors, whose expertise lies in fields other than economics. 
Intent does not help to separate competition from attempted 
monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard competition. It 
also complicates litigation. Lawyers rummage through business 
records seeking to discover tidbits that will sound impressive (or 
aggressive) when read to a jury. Traipsing through the 
warehouses of business in search of misleading evidence both 
increases the costs of litigation and reduces the accuracy of 
decisions. Stripping intent away brings the real economic 
questions to the fore at the same time as it streamlines antitrust 
litigation .... [W]e [therefore] now hold that intent is not a basis 
of liability (or a ground for inferring the existence of such a basis) 
in a predatory pricing case under the Sherman Act. 
Id. at 1401-02. 
204. !d. at 1404. 
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in monopolization cases, and allow juries to assess and evaluate 
evidence of predatory intent. 2os 
This section discusses why jurors are better equipped than "judges 
constrained by technical analyses and captured by the economic 
theories before them,,206 to engage successfully in the "difficult 
business,,207 of separating dangerous predatory behavior from 
aggressive pro-competitive conduct. Section lILA first discusses 
why jurors are especially well-equipped to meaningfully assess and 
evaluate evidence of predatory intent, and apply community 
standards of morality and fairness. 2os Section I1LB then explains how 
juries provide a robust evolutionary means for evaluating complex 
economic issues and reaching meaningful consensuses in antitrust 
cases concerning potential predatory and unfair anti-competitive 
conduct by dominant firms and monopolies. 209 Section IILe 
discusses how reviving antitrust jury trials will help restore and 
revitalize a valuable and necessary community-based investment in 
our antitrust laws and their enforcement. 210 
A. Jurors Are Evolutionarily-Equipped to Meaningfully Assess 
Predatory Intent and Apply Community Standards of Morality 
and Fairness in Section 2 Cases 
Our most basic behavioral dispositions are the results of millions 
of years of evolution, and "cannot be understood without recourse to 
205. See infra Part III. A. 
206. Horton, supra note 12, at 522. 
207. A. A. Poultry Farms, 848 F.2d at 1400. Ironically, Judge Easterbrook characterizes 
the separation of predatory and pro-competitive conduct as a "difficult business." Yet 
his simplistic theoretical conclusions tum it into a "simple business" with an 
inevitable result: the dominant firm or monopolist wins. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1984) ("[In merger cases, t]he 
identity of the plaintiff is all the court needs to know ... [and challenges] by a 
business rival against a merger or joint venture should be dismissed."); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for ExclUSionary 
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345, 357-58 (arguing that predation and 
exclusion should be "governed by a wait-and-see attitude" because the economic costs 
of false positives are so high); Roszkowski, supra note 49, at 195 (arguing that in 
dealer termination cases, "a plaintiff is virtually assured defeat" under Chicago School 
economic theories); id. at 165 ("By permitting all defendants using whatever variety 
or combinatIOn of vertical restraints to parade the same Chicago School laundry list of 
'coulds,' 'mights,' and 'mays' in justification before the trier off act, and requiring the 
plaintiff to prove their inapplicability, the plaintiff is guaranteed defeat."). 
208. See infra Part IlIA 
209. See infra Part III.B. 
210. See infra Part III.e. 
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evolutionary theory.,,2l1 It is therefore not surprising that we are 
witnessing increasing efforts to apply evolutionary theory to human 
economic behavior. 212 In the words of legal theorist Bart Du Laing: 
"[T]he time has come for evolutionary minded legal scholars to 
replenish from the original source, being biological evolutionary 
theory, as currently applied in a variety of ways to our own 
species. ,,213 
Chicago/Harvard economic models based on solitary individual 
economic maximizers are inconsistent with our evolutionary history, 
which "has ensured that we are able to get more from social living 
than from the pursuit of a solitary, selfish life."214 "'[G]reed is 
good' ... is a childish and unethical rhetoric, however popular it has 
been on Wall Street and in the Department of Economics."215 Our 
dynamic economic system is dependent upon our unique evolutionary 
history of successful cooperation-not greed?16 Future economic 
211. WOJCIECH ZALUSKI, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, at ix (2009). 
212. See, e.g., BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 187 ("[O]rganizations, markets, and 
economics are not just like evolutionary systems; they truly, literally are evolutionary 
systems .... "); Horton, supra note 12, at 469-71 (recommending that we look to 
evolutionary biology for guidance in applying the antitrust laws). 
213. Bart Du Laing, Gene-Culture Co-Evolutionary Theory and the Evolution of Legal 
Behavior and Institutions, in LAW, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, supra 
note 23, at 248, 264. 
214. MARTIN A. NOWAK & ROGER HIGHFIELD, SUPER COOPERATORS: ALTRUISM, 
EVOLUTION, AND WHY WE NEED EACH OTHER TO SUCCEED 272 (2011); see also 
DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 128 ("Chicago theory lacks an explanation of the 
administrative dynamics of organizations."). 
215. DEIDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN'T EXPLAIN THE 
MODERN WORLD 446 (2010). 
216. See, e.g., SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 4-5. 
Jd. 
Homo sapiens sapiens is the only animal that engages in 
elaborate task-sharing-the division of labour as it is sometimes 
known-between genetically unrelated members of the same 
species. 
. . Nowhere else in nature do unrelated members of the same 
species-genetic rivals incited by instinct and history to fight one 
another-cooperate on projects of such complexity and requiring 
such a high degree of mutual trust as human beings do. 
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theories must therefore be based as much on ethics and moralitl 17 as 
on domination, greed, and selfishness.218 
Our long history of economic cooperation has enabled and 
required us to construct social rules and habits that appropriately 
constrain our "violent and unreliable instincts.,,219 Maximally robust 
moral reasoning has evolved in humans to enable us to appropriately 
balance our cooperation and selfish instincts. 220 Our social rules and 
habits have further enabled us to develop "a rich network of 
facilitating relationships" based upon "cooperation, mutual support, 
and enrichment.,,221 As stated by Harvard mathematics and biology 
Professor Martin A. Nowak: "[I]f conscience and empathy were 
impediments to the advancement of self-interest, then we would have 
evolved to be amoral sociopaths. But we have not.,,222 
Evidence from a host of fields shows that "fairness evolved as a 
stable strategy for maintaining social harmony" in our economic 
relationships.223 Neurobiological studies have found that "the sense 
217. See Du Laing, supra note 213, at 255 ("[C]ulture appears more as a part of the 
solution than as a part of the problem. . .. [T]his emphasis on a plausible 
evolutionary theory of social norms and institutions is of particular relevance for an 
evolutionary analysis in law aiming at incorporating regulating behavior in its 
analyses."). 
218. See, e.g., GOODWIN, supra note 122, at xii-xiii. 
Darwinism sees the living process in terms that emphasize 
competition, inheritance, selfishness, and survival as the driving 
forces of evolution. . .. But Darwinism shortchanges our 
biological natures. We are every bit as cooperative as we are 
competitive; as altruistic as we are selfish .. And we are 
biologically grounded in relationships .... 
Jd.; see also RUSE, supra note 121, at 2 ("[Economic Darwinism and 'survival of the 
fittest' have] reflect[ed] and justifie[d] the grossest sins in our society-domination, 
greed, selfishness, sexism, and more002E"). 
219. SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 6. 
220. CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 6, 59-61, 71; see also RUSE, supra note 121, at 279 
("Humans are not all bad. We cooperate and work together. Humans are not all 
good. We are selfish and serve our own ends rather than the needs of others. This is 
our nature .... "). 
221. GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 188. 
222. NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 89-90. "Homo economicus," on the other 
hand, "is a sociopath." Lynn Ann Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL 
MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157, 158-59 (Paul J. Zak 
ed., 2008). Stout adds, "The hallmark of sociopathy is extreme selfishness as shown 
by a willingness to lie, cheat, take advantage, [and] exploit." Id. at 159 (quoting 
BENJAMIN WOLMAN, THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY 42 (1987». 
223. SHERMER, supra note 160, at II. Similarly, "[a]mong chimpanzees, a rudimentary 
sense of right and wrong, related to what serves their group's common good, plays a 
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of fairness fundamental to distributive justice" is rooted in humans' 
t · I . 224 emo lOna process mg. In short, human morality helps us to 
mediate the inherent tensions between our cooperative and 
competitive, and altruistic and selfish instincts. 225 Indeed, "diverse 
faiths are united by the reciprocity of the Golden Rule.,,226 
As a function of our robust moral capacities, we are well-
equipped, from an evolutionary and social perspective, to fairly 
evaluate the predatory intent of dominant firms and monopolists. 227 
Humans have developed keen abilities to quickly figure out who can 
be trusted in ongoing economic interactions. 228 "Brain imaging 
seems to support the view that part of our cortex is specialized to deal 
with the ceaseless computations required to keep count of what we 
give and what we receive, and to respond emotionally to perceived 
imbalance.,,229 In other words, humans are evolutionarily hard-wired 
to quickly judge others' intentions. 230 
Humans have to be good at reading others' intentions231 because 
our evolutionary development of languages has dramatically 
increased the opportunities for manipulation and deception when we 
seek to cooperate with others.232 We understand "that a mix of 
crucial role in maintaining a chimpanzee group's integrity." Leigh, supra note 113, at 
381. 
224. ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 119, at 160. 
225. See GOODWIN, supra note 122, at xiii; RUSE, supra note 121, at 252-54. 
226. See NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 273. 
227. See Horton, supra note 12, at 505,510. 
228. See KARL SIGMUND, THE CALCULUS OF SELFISHNESS 19 (2010) ("[P]layers [in a 
Prisoner's Dilemma game] who are allowed to briefly talk with each other.. can 
predict very accurately, after a short conversation, whether their co-players will 
cooperate or not. Even without knowing which type of experiment is in store for 
them, they quickly pick up the relevant clues for summing up their partner."); 
EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 151 (2002) ("People by and large are 
natural geniuses at spotting deception in others."); Horton, supra note 13, at 518 
("The human brain has evolved masterful abilities to calculate fairness. Parallel with 
this evolution, we have developed keen abilities to detect cheating." (footnote 
omitted)). 
229. See SIGMUND, supra note 228, at 9. For an interesting discussion of human brains as 
"extremely complex information-processing machines," see SEIFE, supra note 9, at 
211-15. 
230. See NOWAK WITH HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 55. 
231. See id. ("We require, in the parlance of the psychologists, a 'theory of mind,' that 
remarkable capacity that enables us to understand the desires, motivations, and 
intentions of others. This mind-reading ability allows us to infer another's 
perspective-whether emotional or intellectual. "). 
232. See id. at 187 ("[L]anguage, brainpower, and society became entwined in a three-way 
dance. What resulted as each component moved in step with one another was 
coevolution, a spiral toward more and more social complexity as language allowed for 
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cooperators (law-abiding citizens) and defectors (criminals) will 
always persist in human societies.,,233 Consequently, we have 
developed acute sensitivities toward others' intentions. 234 We are 
therefore evolutionarily well-equipped to meaningfully evaluate and 
react to others' maxims and intentions. 235 
The reason that juries have been "impressed,,236 by evidence of 
predatory intent is that such evidence strikes deep evolutionary 
chords.237 On the other hand, the so-called rational Chicago/Harvard 
economic models that eschew fairness and intent lack meaningful 
biological, evolutionary, or historical foundations.238 Consequently, 
we should welcome evidence and information about the motivations 
and intentions that lie behind the actions of dominant ftrms and 
monopolists.239 We should allow antitrust juries to assess such 
evidence fully in judging predatory behavior.240 
Jurors are also well-prepared to meaningfully apply and enforce 
community standards of morality and fairness in antitrust cases. 241 
even more manipulation and deception, and even more collaboration and cooperation 
too."); RIDLEY, supra note 130, at 116 ("The notion that our brains grew big to help us 
make tools or start fires on the savannah has long since lost favour. Instead, most 
evolutionists believe in the Machiavellian theory-that bigger brains were needed in 
an arms race between manipulation and resistance to manipulation."). 
233. NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 37. 
234. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS 357-
59 (Univ. Chi. Press 1965) (1872) ("As most of the movements of expression must 
have been gradually acquired, afterwards becoming instinctive, there seems to be 
some degree of a priori probability that their recognition would likewise have become 
instinctive. . .. [A]ll the chief expressions exhibited by man are the same throughout 
the world."); WILSON, supra note 173, at 171-72 ("[O]ne capacity, the detection of 
cheating, is developed to exceptional levels of sharpness and rapid calculation."); 
WILSON, supra note 228, at 151 ("Psychologists.. have discovered a hereditary 
tendency to detect cheaters and to respond to them with intense moral outrage."). 
235. In this sense, unlike the ChicagolHarvard theoreticians, we rely less on consequences 
and more on states of mind and intentions in making our moral evaluations. See 
CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 131 ("Our maxims and intentions are what counts, not 
the outcomes of our actions."). 
236. See A. A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
237. See ZALUSKI, supra note 211, at xi. 
238. See DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 128-31. 
239. See PRASANTA K. PATTANAIK, ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND SOCIAL 
WELF ARE 14 (2009) ("While the game form approach provides a flexible framework 
for the analysis of rights, I now believe that it needs to be supplemented by 
information that lies behind people's actions."). 
240. See id. 
241. See Du LAING, supra note 213, at 248, 254-55; ZALUSKI, supra note 211, at 123. 
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Humans' willingness to enforce community standards is a product of 
natural selection and is critical in supporting economic 
cooperation. 242 Jurors are willing to apply community morality 
standards and punish defectors (or antitrust violators) in the hopes of 
reforming them and to retaliate on behalf of and protect third parties 
(such as injured competitors).243 
The threat of societal retaliation is crucial in protecting economic 
cooperation.244 The threat of revenge sharply reduces the incidence 
of cheating in economic game simulations. 245 Antitrust juries provide 
an ideal "threat point" against predatory conduce46 because jurors are 
willing to apply community standards to protect injured parties. 
Furthermore, juries are not intimidated because a dominant fIrm or 
monopolist cannot realistically retaliate against individual jurors.247 
Dominant fIrms and monopolists are far more likely to act fairly 
and procompetitively if they face a realistic possibility of a jury 
fmding out about their predatory conduct and holding them 
accountable for it. 248 Such f]fms understand that their goodwill and 
positive business reputations come at a great economic cost and can 
242. See, e.g., ZALUSKI, supra note 215, at 114 ("It seems that the instinct for retaliation is 
a product of natural selection: generally speaking it is evolutionarily advantageous for 
a victim of immoral treatment to punish a person who violated the norms of the first-
order morality with regard to her, as it shows the wrongdoer and other potential 
violators of these norms that the person who displays this emotion cannot be easily 
exploited. One should also add that altruistic punishment is regarded as a 
component of strong reciprocity. "). 
243. See SIGMUND, supra note 228, at 15. 
244. See, e.g., NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 29 ("It seem[s] that the prospect of 
vengeful retaliation paves the way for amicable cooperation."). 
245. See, e.g., SEABRIGHT, supra note 156, at 68. 
246. See, e.g., ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 119, at 148. 
247. On the other hand, the temptations to engage in predatory behavior seem 
overwhelming in a legal system that offers no countervailing credible threat to such 
behavior (like the current Chicago/Harvard system). See id. at 148-49 ("For 
computation purposes [in determining what the optimal bargain is], Nash showed that 
the optimal compromise is uniquely found by maximizing the product of the 
individual's net payoffs relative to their threat point."). 
248. See NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 54 ("By the same token, our behavior is 
endlessly molded by the possibility that somebody else might be watching us or fmd 
out what we have done. We are often troubled by the thought of what others may 
think of our deeds. .. Our behavior is [therefore] affected by the possibility that 
somebody else might be watching us."); id. at 217 ("When people behave in a 
charitable way, it reveals much about the fact that their behavior has been honed down 
the generations by ancestors wanting to make a good impression whenever they find 
themselves in circumstances where they suspect they are being watched. This need to 
impress was felt as keenly in a close-knit hunter-gatherer clan as in today's 
surveillance society. "). 
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be sullied, compromised, or destroyed through public trials and 
jurors' exposure to evil and anticompetitive intent. 249 As Harvard 
evolutionary biologist and mathematical theoretician Martin Nowak 
observes: "Whenever individual behavior is relevant to the public 
good, it should itself be made public to help avert tragedy. ,,250 
Indeed, "a simple mathematical model reveals how concerns for 
reputation can lead to the establishment of fairness norms. ,,251 
The Chicago/Harvard theorists concede that, in monopolization 
cases: 
[t]he defendant's stated purpose can often point the 
tribunal's analysis in the correct direction: toward a 
determination of whether that purpose is legitimate in 
principle and, if so, whether the challenged conduct is 
reasonably necessary to serve that purpose. Intention may 
also help to classify otherwise ambiguous behavior. 252 
It is time to hold them to this concession. Since jurors are 
evolutionarily well-equipped to meaningfully assess predatory intent 
and apply community standards of morality and fairness in Section 2 
cases,253 we should let them return to doing the jobs that our nation's 
founders intended they do. The time has come to revive antitrust jury 
trials in monopolization cases. 
B. Juries Provide a Robust Evolutionary and Democratic Means for 
Evaluating Complex Economic Issues and Reaching Meaningful 
Consensuses in Section 2 Cases 
Why do we have nine justices on our Supreme Court? Why do we 
have 100 senators and 435 congressmen? Why does our President 
have a cabinet? Why did our nation's founders include a right to jury 
trials in our Constitution? The simple answer is that '''[t]he more 
complex the problem and the more complex the environment, the 
249. See id. at 55 ("Indirect reciprocity relies on what others think of us. . .. [I]f you have 
been a cad and a rotter, I am less likely to trust you to deliver."); SIGMUND, supra note 
228, at 13 ("Under natural circumstances, an emotional response is likely to attract 
some attention. Anger is loud."). 
250. NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 218. Nowak adds that "[w]e need new ways 
to advertise how people behave." Id. Antitrust jury trials offer us one of the best 
ways to gain insights into dominant finns' and monopolies' real goals and intentions. 
251. SIGMUND, supra note 228, at 13. 
252. Areeda, supra note 197, at 963. 
253. See supra notes 227-230 and accompanying text. 
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more diverse points of view you need. ",254 Moreover, the "vigorous 
discussion characteristic of diverse decision making bodies also 
promotes fact-fmding.,,255 
A jellybean contest can help us '"understand the extraordinary 
potential of combined brainpower.,,256 When individuals try to guess 
the number of jelly beans in a jar, their initial estimates inevitably are 
off the mark.257 Amazingly, however, when one averages their 
guesses, "the average of everyone's guess[es] in a jelly bean contest 
will come significantly closer than anyone person's guess.,,258 
Moreover, "the greater the number of people participating, the closer 
the collaborative guess becomes.,,259 
Could our founding fathers therefore have gotten it right in our 
Seventh Amendment? After all, juries, like any biological system, 
"are information-processing machines and this must be an essential 
part of any theory we may construct.,,260 More than a century ago, 
our Supreme Court seemed to agree. For example, in Sioux City & 
Pacific Railroad v. Stout,261 the Court observed: 
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising 
men of education and men of little education, men of 
learning and men whose learning consists only in what they 
have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the 
mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, 
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the 
facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. . .. It is 
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs 
of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer 
254. JEFFREY KLUGER, SIMPLEXITY: WHY SIMPLE THINGS BECOME COMPLEX (AND How 
COMPLEX THINGS CAN BE MADE SIMPLE) 39 (2008) (quoting Brooke Harrington, 
sociologist and professor of public policy); see also CASEBEER, supra note 112, at 144 
("The epistemology of discovering proper functions is essentially scientific-it 
requires experimentation and a toleration of a certain diversity of approaches, as well 
as a communitarian commitment to constant criticism and improvement. This inquiry-
based epistemology fits in well with our softly fixed natures .... "). 
255. Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J. L. & POL'y 19, 45 
(2007); see also Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 217 (1989) (noting that the "counterbalancing of various 
biases" is a benefit of the jury system (quoting Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 
(1978». 
256. KLUGER, supra note 254, at 37. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 37. 
259. Id. at 38. 
260. See Brenner, supra note 131, at 40, 44. 
261. Sioux City & P. RR., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873). 
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conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a 
single judge.262 
Eschewing our Supreme Court's earlier democratic reasoning, 
Professor Turner argued that "elimination of [antitrust] juries would 
increase the probability of accurate results.,,263 Juries, the 
ChicagoiHarvard theorists contend, are simply unable "to arrive at a 
rational decision because the nature and complexity of the factual and 
legal issues raised in most antitrust cases are beyond their 
competence. ,,264 
The Chicago/Harvard approach represents anti-democratic 
paternalism at its worst. Why are we so certain that juries cannot 
fairly assess and evaluate predatory conduct? As noted by Professor 
Adam J. Hirsch, "[T]he cognitive deficiencies of judges 
themselves-being every bit as human as the persons whose suits 
they hear-suggest that they, too, are apt to make imperfect 
262. Id at 664. Approximately twenty years later, the Indiana Court of Appeals concurred, 
explaining: 
The jurors, in their callings and experiences, have usually come in 
contact with, and observed, the conduct of men under varied 
conditions. It is this diversity which gives value to their 
unanimous judgment. Collectively, they are more capable of 
determining how an ordinarily prudent man would act under given 
conditions than judges of courts, whose experiences are usually 
confined to one calling, and who are proverbially prone to 
generalize and follow precedents. 
Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Consol. Ry. v. Berry, 36 N.E. 646, 650 (Ind. App. 
1894). For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a 
Jury Decision and Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1125, 1166-67 (2003). 
263. Turner, supra note 20, at 812. See also Neil Komesar, Stranger in a Strange Land: 
An Outsider·s View of Antitrust and the Courts, 41 LoY. U CHI. L.J. 443,444 (2010) 
("There is little doubt that juries have limited technical expertise and sophistication."). 
264. Turner, supra note 20, at 812. Professor Turner's sentiments have also been followed 
by our current Supreme Court in questioning jurors' abilities to decide factual claims 
in patent cases. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 US. 370, 388-90 
(1996) (considering "relative interpretive skills of judges and juries" and fmding 
judges better suited to interpret patent claims); Kirgis, supra note 262, at 1129; David 
B. Pieper, The Appropriate Judicial Actor for Patent Interpretation: A Commentary 
on the Supreme Court's Decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 51 ARK. 
L. REv. 159 (1998); Theresa M. Seal, Casenote, The Jury Is Out: Supreme Court 
Confirms Construction of Patent Claim Falls Within Exclusive Province of the Court, 
22 S.ILL. U L.J. 785 (1998). 
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choices.,,265 Could it be that the real fear of the Chicago/Harvard 
theorists is that juries will decide monopolization cases on the 
evidence before them rather than biased and misguided 
ChicagolHarvard economic theories?266 
We do not live in the simple bright-line world idealized by the 
ChicagolHarvard theoreticians. "Modern physicists realize that even 
the most solid laws-even the second law [of thermodynamics]-
have a statistical element to them.,,267 Since "[ e ]ven simply 
determined systems can behave chaotically," the precise details of 
any complex systems are not, as the ChicagolHarvard theoreticians 
would have us believe, predictable. 268 But the collaborative hunches 
of jurors, based on seeing real witnesses and documents, pushes 
toward "the complexities of moderation" rather than "the simplicity 
of extremism. ,,269 Thus, juries are well-prepared to evaluate and 
analyze "surprises due to the emergence of unexpected behavior," 
such as dangerous and unfair predatory conduct by dominant fIrms 
265. Adam 1. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for 
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 425, 425 (2005). More fully, Professor 
Hirsch observed: 
From a behavioral perspective, recognition of the potential for 
irrationality by citizens can serve to justify paternalistic rules that 
operate to limit choice, and thereby to protect citizens from the 
regret that would accompany poor decisions. Yet the cognitive 
deficiencies of judges themselves-being every bit as human as 
the persons whose suits they hear-suggest that they, too, are apt 
to make imperfect choices. As concerns their lawmaking function, 
judges' efforts to craft ideal common law rules are doomed to 
failure-a failure that (by analogy) paternalistic mechanisms can 
forestall only in limited respects. 
Accordingly, scholars who posit that judges generally aspire to 
establish efficient rules cannot thereby conclude that the common 
law tends ineluctably in that direction. Those scholars must take 
into account the pressures of time and shortcomings of ability that 
degrade judicial decisionmaking. Anything concocted by the 
human mind-including law-betrays the infirmities of that mind. 
Id. at 425-26 (footnotes omitted). 
266. As noted by Flynn and Ponsoldt, the "law and economics movement tends in the 
direction of rigid formalism." Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 107, at 1139 n.58. They 
list possible explanations to include "a desire to impose disguised normative values 
for unstated political reasons, protection of the status quo, or fear that undue judicial 
discretion would lead to multi valued rules of decision." Id. at 1139 (footnotes 
omitted). 
267. SEIFE, supra note 9, at 53. 
268. RIDLEY,SUpra note 130, at 311-12. 
269. KLUGER, supra note 254, at 93; see also GOODWIN, supra note 122, at 78 ("[T]he 
study of complex systems goes beyond reductionism, which focuses on the analysis of 
the components out of which a system is made."). 
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and monopolies. 270 And they are just as well, if not better, equipped 
than judges straitjacketed by biased economic theories to sort out and 
meaningfully assess the endless mathematical possibilities in our 
complex economic environment. 271 
Perhaps most importantly, jurors are evolutionarily '''wired for 
justice.",272 Neural regions in our brain activated by unfairness "are 
the same ones activated by feelings of disgust. That's not just a 
dispassionate reaction to an inequitable bargain, that's a primal 
recoiling.,,273 Our "sense of fairness is not a thing calculable in a 
physics equation,,,274 but it is rooted in our evolutionary core.275 
In In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation/76 the 
Third Circuit vacated a district judge's order holding that a plaintiff 
had a right to trial by jury in an action for treble damages under the 
antitrust and antidumping laws.277 Characterizing the case as "too 
complex for a jury," the Third Circuit ruled that "due process 
precludes trial by jury when a jury is unable to perform this task with 
a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal rules.,,278 
Dissenting, Circuit Judge Gibbons presciently noted: 
270. See GOODWIN, supra note 125, at 78. 
271. See NOWAK & HIGHFIELD, supra note 214, at 49 ("Despite the thousands of papers 
written on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the mathematical possibilities in this 
model of direct reciprocity are open-ended, like chess, and not closed, like the 
strategies for playing tic-tac-toe. Our analysis of how to solve the Dilemma will 
never be completed. This Dilemma has no end. "). 
272. KLUGER, supra note 254, at 43 (quoting Samuel Bowles, professor of economics). 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. See, e.g., ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 119, at 160 ("Indeed, neurobiological study has 
found that the sense of fairness fundamental to distributive justice 'as suggested by 
moral sentimentalists, is rooted in emotional processing.'" (citing Ming Hsu, Cedric 
Anen & Steven R. Quartz, The Right and the Good: Distributive Justice and Neural 
Encoding of Equity and Efficiency, 320 SCIENCE 1092, 1092 (2008))). 
276. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). 
277. See id. at 1086, 1090. 
278. Id. at 1084. 
Courts have disagreed as to whether a party's jury demand may 
be stricken if the complexity of the case would make it impossible 
for a jury to render a fair decision. The Ninth Circuit 
concluded. .. that there is no complexity exception to the 
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. The Second, Fifth, 
and Tenth Circuits have rejected arguments that particular cases 
were so complex as to justify denying a jury trial without reaching 
the question whether there is a complexity exception. 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 975-76 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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[A]ttempts to objectify the factors that bear upon 
complexity. .. will permit the exercise of trial court 
discretion. I fear that the exercise of that discretion will 
sometimes be influenced by unarticulated sympathies for or 
hostilities toward the underlying policies sought to be 
advanced in the lawsuit. 279 
Judge Gibbons continued: 
Part of my difficulty with the majority's position probably 
results from a perception of the nature of the judicial 
process and the role of juries in that process. It is often said 
that the judicial process involves the search for objective 
truth. We have no real assurance, however, of objective 
truth whether the trial is to the court or to a jury. The 
judicial process can do no more than legitimize the 
imposition of sanctions by requiring that some minimum 
standards of fair play, which we call due process, are 
adhered to. In this legitimizing process, the seventh 
amendment is not a useless appendage to the Bill of Rights, 
but an important resource in maintaining the authority of the 
rule of law .... 
In light, therefore, of the important functions served by 
the seventh amendment's protection of the right to a trial by 
jury, I would hold that there is no case in which properly 
separated claims for relief cognizable at common law would 
be so complex that trial by jury would amount to a violation 
of due process.280 
279. Id. at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
280. Jd. After the district judge's ruling permitting a jury trial was vacated and remanded 
by the Third Circuit, the district court eventually granted summary judgment for the 
defendant Japanese television manufacturers. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The Third Circuit then affirmed 
in part, and reversed in part, the district court's summary judgment ruling. In re 
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983). The 
Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the Third Circuit's ruling in a famous 5-4 
antitrust decision. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). Commissioner Kovacic notes that in the Supreme Court's Matsushita 
decision, "Areeda and Turner are the most frequently cited commentators." Kovacic, 
supra note 7, at 46 n.139. 
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We should follow Judge Gibbons' prescient reasoning and 
embrace and trust jurors' communal senses of fairness and justice281 
by reviving antitrust jury trials. 
C. Reviving Antitrust Jury Trials Will Help Restore and Revitalize a 
Valuable and Necessary Community-Based Investment in Our 
Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement 
Citizen participation in public decision-making is the hallmark of 
American democracy. 282 Our American citizens bring to the jury 
pool their diverse heritages, backgrounds, and experiences "honoring 
a balance of virtues.,,283 They also bring a deep "sense of moral 
responsibility.,,284 Thrown together as jurors, they produce "a 
combinatorial explosion" that represents democracy in action. 285 
281. As noted by economist Oliver Williamson: 
The Matsushita case dragged on for over a dozen years. 
Although a complex case, the core theory espoused by the 
plaintiff apparently was that Japanese television manufacturers 
engaged in collusion and dumping .... 
The Supreme Court, however, did not evaluate the plausibility 
of the case by assessing the plaintiffs theory. Rather, the Court 
examined the plausibility of the defendant's case [and embraced 
Judge Easterbrook's predation theories]. 
Williamson, supra note 38, at 211, 233-34. With all due respect to the Supreme 
Court, a jury of twelve citizens could have more fairly and objectively reviewed the 
factual evidence and applied the relevant legal theories, and it would not have taken 
anything close to twelve plus years to get a final resolution. Moreover, since 
Matsushita, "[t]he study of strategic behavior has been elaborated" to show the 
economic plausibility and substantial benefits of defendants' conduct. Id. at 234. 
282. See THOMAS CHRISTIANO, PmLOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 3 
(Thomas Christiano ed., 2003); cf New York v. County of Schoharie, 82 F. Supp. 
2d 19,23 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Unquestionably, the right to vote in an election is [a] 
hallmark of our democracy."). 
283. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 215, at 438. 
284. See Phillip Clayton, Biology and Purpose: Altruism, Morality, and Human Nature in 
Evolutionary Perspective, in EVOLUTION AND ETmcs: HUMAN MORALITY IN 
BIOLOGICAL & RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 318, 331 (Phillip Clayton & Jeffrey Schloss 
eds., 2004) (emphasis omitted). 
285. Id. at 330. Chicago-Harvard theoreticians would, of course, disagree with this 
assessment. At least one evolutionary scientist believes that the "combinatorial 
explosion" may not necessarily be a good thing. Professor Richard Dawkins believes 
that "[t]rial by jury may be one ofthe most conspicuously bad good ideas anyone ever 
had." RICHARD DAWKINS, A DEVIL'S CHAPLAIN: REFLECTIONS ON HOPE, LIES, 
SCIENCE, AND LOVE 38 (2003). Dawkins argues that in practice, "twelve assessments 
of the evidence" does not really happen because 'juries are massively swayed by one 
or two vocal individuals." Id. at 40. Dawkms adds, "There is also strong pressure to 
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. I~ IS a mistake to view economic competition as divorced and 
dIstmct from our societal culture and fundamental values. 286 Adam 
Smith himself long ago recognized that "justice comprehends all the 
social virtues."287 Our "human sense of justice explicitly addresses 
communitywide issues," and imposes constraints on social and 
economic behavior that we "agree[] on and enforce[] collectively.,,288 
In enforcing our social and economic virtues and norms, we juggle a 
complicated set of shared norms and values. 289 Adam Smith further 
recognized that it is futile, as the ChicagolHarvard theoreticians have 
attempted, "to direct by precise rules what it belongs to feeling and 
sentiment only to judge of. ,,290 
confonn to a unanimous verdict, which further undermines the principle of 
independent data." Id. It is Important to recognize that Dawkins's opinion rests upon 
"the three juries that it has been [his] misfortune to serve on." Id. Based on having 
closely watched dozens of mock juries in real and educational cases, this author's 
experience does not match Professor Dawkins's. 
286. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUY AM A, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY 6-7 (1995) ("Although economic activity IS inextricably linked with 
social and political life, there is a mistaken tendency, encouraged by contemporary 
economic discourse, to regard the economy as a facet of life with its own laws, 
separate from the rest of society .. " [E]conomic activity represents a crucial part of 
social life and is knit together by a wide variety of nonns, rules, moral obligations, 
and other habits that together shape the society."). 
287. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, reprinted in THE GLASGOW 
EDITION OF THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH (D. D. Raphael & A. 
L. Macfie, eds.) (photo. reprint 1982) (Oxford University Press 1976) (1759). 
288. Frans B. M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee's Sense of Social Regularity and Its Relation 
to the Human Sense of Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF LAW 241,254 (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992). 
289. See STEPHEN S. HALL, WISDOM: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO NEUROSCIENCE 207 (2010) 
("[A]lthough Homo economicus insists by definition on a narrow and material 
definition of 'preference,' Homo sapiens ultimately juggles a much more complicated 
set of values."). 
290. SMITH, supra note 287, at 339. Smith observed: 
It may be said in general of the works of the casuists that they 
attempted, to no purpose, to direct by precise rules what it belongs 
to feeling and sentiment only to judge of. How is it possible to 
ascertain by rules the exact point at which, in every case, a 
delicate sense of justice begins to run into a frivolous and weak 
scrupulosity of conscience? What is the highest pitch of 
freedom and ease of behaviour which can be regarded as graceful 
and becoming, and when it is that it first begins to run into a 
negligent and thoughtless licentiousness? With regard to all such 
matters, what would hold good in anyone case would scarce do 
so exactly in any other, and what constitutes the propriety and 
happiness of behavior varies in every case with the smallest 
variety of situation. Books of casuistry, therefore, are generally as 
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History has proven over and over that businesses sometimes lie, 
disseminate disinformation, and engage in predatory conduct 
designed to crush competitors. 291 To best protect ourselves against 
such manipulation, we must acknowledge and pinpoint "the 
vulnerabilities of our faculties of categorization, language, and 
imagery," rather than deny or fear their complexity.292 Fortunately, 
our "strongly ingrained rules about fairness and reciprocity,,293 and 
our evolutionarily-programmed "resistan[ ce] to attack by free riders 
and cheaters,,294 are ideal for communally sorting out and evaluating 
allegations of predatory conduct by dominant flrms and monopolies. 
Rather than fearing jurors' cultural norms and values, we should 
welcome their contributions in helping to create and enforce higher 
norms of business ethics and conduct.295 Instead of obsessing about 
false positives, we should focus on the societal and economic dangers 
of predatory conduct.296 
useless as they are commonly tiresome. .. None of them tend to 
soften us to what is gentle and humane. Many of them, on the 
contrary, tend rather to teach us to chicane with our own 
consciences, and by their vain subtilties serve to authorise 
innumerable evasive refinements with regard to the most essential 
articles of our duty. 
Id. at 339-40. A more recent critic might label the Chicago/Harvard theories as 
"greedy reductionism," which can "lead us to deny the existence of real levels, real 
complexities, real phenomena." GEORGE LEVINE, DARWIN LOVES You: NATURAL 
SELECTION AND THE RE-ENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD 104 (2006) (quoting DANIEL C. 
DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 82 
(1995»; see also Robert Pitofsky, Setting the Stage, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that concerns today about antitrust 
"include current preferences for economic models over facts"). 
291. See Horton, supra note 12, at 500-02. 
292. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 217 
(2002). 
293. BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 121. 
294. Id. at 269. 
295. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 286, at 26 ("Trust is the expectation that arises 
within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly 
shared norms, on the part of other members of that community. . .. [W]hile contract 
and self-interest are important sources of association, the most effective organizations 
are based on communities of shared ethical values. These communities do not require 
extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations because prior moral 
consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust." (citation omitted». 
296. See, e.g., BEINHOCKER, supra note 110, at 270. Beinhocker observes: "The local 
tuning of reciprocity norms can create very complex dynamics at the level of 
populations. High-cooperation societies can see collapses in cooperation if cheating 
reaches a critical mass; low cooperation societies can get stuck 10 uncooperative, 
economically impoverished dead ends ... " Id. Indeed, "[a] frightening 'lack of 
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It is easy for dominant fIrms and monopolies to claim that hard 
evidence of predatory intent is merely the meaningless musings of 
enthusiastic middle-level managers. After all, humans and businesses 
both have enormous capacities for self-deception. Indeed, given 
humans' hard-wired skills in mind-reading and deciphering 
intentions, "it is to your advantage to sincerely believe in your own 
innocence. Biologically as well as socially, it's often advantageous 
to deceive yourself into believing that you are fully innocent, since 
others are then more likely to believe you as well. ,,297 
Furthermore, even though corporations enjoy many of the rights of 
individuals through the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to our constitution, "corporations are neither susceptible to the 
standards of accountability nor the deterring effects of punishment to 
which people are subject.,,298 For example, a corporation cannot be 
put in jail. This has "greatly increase [ d] the power of corporations 
and [broken] the ties of accountability that attach it to a society as a 
whole.,,299 
We need to demand more public accountability from our 
businesses, especially dominant fIrms and monopolies. "The nature 
of the human commitment to morality is that all people in a 
community-dominant as well as subordinate-must be held 
accountable to the same standards of ethical behavior.,,30o 
moral purpose' has been a fundamental problem in our recent economic debacles." 
Horton, supra note 12, at 513. Interestingly, in the field of genetics, Matt Ridley has 
observed: "Arguably, more damage has been done by false negatives (true genes that 
have been prematurely ruled out on inadequate data) than by false positives 
(suspicions of a link that later proved unfounded)." Ridley, supra note 130, at 73. 
297. Clayton, supra note 284, at 328; see also PINKER, supra note 292, at 111 (,,[T]he best 
liar is one who believes his own lie."); id at 325 ("Since the most effective bluffer is 
the one who believes his own bluff, a limited degree of self-deception in hostile 
escalations can evolve. It has to be limited, because . . . when the limits are 
miscalibrated and both sides go to the brink, the result can be a human disaster."). 
298. GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 103. For an excellent discussion of the 
constitutional rights of corporations and their judicial origins, see TED NACE, supra 
note 146, at 11-85. 
299. GOERGEN ET AL., supra note 141, at 103. The authors add that "corporations should 
be expected to obey the law" to help "foster[] a realistic perspective from which 
corporate governance can be expected to improve." Id at 104. The authors note that 
their "normative arguments are based on the perspective that a corporation is a social 
citizen and should therefore be made accountable for the social externalities that may 
ensue from its activities." Id at 46. 
300. Lionel Tiger, The Evolution of Cultural Norms, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE, supra note 
288, at 278, 287; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 286, at 150 ("Modem institutions 
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for modem prosperity and the social well-
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Accountability to jurors will help augment the economic and social 
conditions necessary to incentivize and encourage hard-fought but 
fair economic competition. 301 As noted by Larry Arnhart: "Frederich 
Hayek understood that a free society can minimize coercion by the 
state only if there is a high degree of voluntary conformity to moral 
rules enforced by social pressure. ,,302 We should therefore stop 
seeking to shelter and protect dominant ftrms and monopolies from 
exposure to juries. 
Adam Smith recognized hundreds of years ago that juries 
additionally help "curb[] the power of the judge [ s]" and act as a 
societal check on judicial power.303 Juries also add respectability and 
authority to our democratic judicial processes. As noted by Third 
Circuit Judge Gibbons in his dissenting opinion in In re Japanese 
Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation: 
In the process of gaining public acceptance for the 
imposition of sanctions, the role of the jury is highly 
being that it undergirds, they have to be combined with certain traditional social and 
ethical habits if they are to work properly."). 
301. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives oj Corporate Directors (Or Why You Don't 
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. 1. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2003) 
("A variety of factors ... may offer a foundation for building a model of human 
behavior that is both more accurate and useful than the homo economicus model. "); 
MICHAEL J. COMER, CORPORATE FRAUD 15 (3d ed. 1998) ("Fraud is contagious and 
corrosive and if supposedly small frauds are allowed to escape they will soon grow."); 
Francesca Gino et aI., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The 
Effect oj One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 398 (2009); Horton, 
supra note 12, at 510-14. 
302. Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism, in PHILOSOPHY AFTER DARWIN: CLASSIC 
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 349, 351 (Michael Ruse ed., 2009). Arnhart 
continued: 
[Hayek] insisted "that freedom has never worked without deeply 
ingrained moral beliefs and that coercion can be reduced to a 
minimum only where individuals can be expected as a rule to 
conform voluntarily to certain principles." Traditional moral rules 
arise from the social pressure of public approval or disapproval. 
A healthy moral order emerges from the spontaneous order of 
civil society that stands between the individual and the state. 
Id. (citing FREDERICK HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 62-63, 146-47 (1960». 
303. See ADAM SMITH, LECTURE ON JURISPRUDENCE OF MARCH 11, 1763, reprinted in 
ADAM SMITH: LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 282, 283 (photo reprint 1982) (R. L. 
Meek et aI., eds., 1978). Smith went on to castigate the courts of France, observing 
that "we see that the courts at their first institution have allways [sic] taken great 
liberties. They are neither tied down by the brieves nor encumbered with a jury." Id. 
at 287. 
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significant. The jury is a sort of ad hoc parliament convened 
from the citizenry at large to lend respectability and 
authority to the process. Judges are often prone to believe 
that they, alone, can bear the full weight of this legitimizing 
function. I doubt that they can. Any erosion of citizen 
participation in the sanctioning system is in the long run 
likely, in my view, to result in a reduction in the moral 
authority that supports the process.304 
We live today in a "society in which individualism and 
community are precariously joined.,,30s The Chicago/Harvard 
theorists proclaim their utter trust in a free market of consumers. 306 
Yet when a representative panel of those consumers is selected as 
citizen jurors, the Chicago/Harvard theorists ironically claim that the 
panel is incapable of grasping and understanding the complexities of 
business and economic competition, which, in the Chicago/Harvard 
model, can be fairly understood only by appointed judges. 307 This is 
the height of anti-democratic arrogance and folly,308 and it is time to 
summarily reject it. By reviving antitrust juries, we can begin the 
process of restoring community-based moral authority to the 
enforcement of our antitrust laws. 309 
304. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(Gibbons, 1., dissenting). 
305. ROBERT WESSON, BEYOND NATURAL SELECTION 137 (1991). Francis Fukuyama 
further observes that "[b ]oth American democracy and American business have been 
successful because they partook of individualism and community simultaneously." 
FUKUY AMA, supra note 286, at 308. 
306. See supra Part III.A. 
307. See supra Part m.B. 
308. Some might go so far as to portray the Chicago/Harvard distrust of juries as part of 
"an elitist and at length a fascist rhetoric against free public opinion itself." See 
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 215, at 439. Professor McCloskey believes that the principal 
seven virtues of prudence, temperance, justice, courage, love, faith, and hope are 
crucial to successful long-term innovation. !d. at 443-44. Juries, of course, present a 
more representative sampling of these seven virtues than any individual judge. 
309. See Arnhart, supra note 302, at 351 (discussing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 
(1993». Arnhart examined Wilson's claim that: 
!d. 
[M]any of the most urgent problems in public policy show the 
importance of moral character. For example, violent crime is a 
problem because a few people lack the self-control and the 
sympathy for the feelings of others that keep most people from 
becoming violent criminals. Good citizens obey the law because 
they have a moral sense that makes them law-abiding. Societies 
become disorderly when too many people fail to show the 
virtuous traits of good moral character. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The current ChicagolHarvard antitrust double helix, and its 
enthusiastic embrace by the Supreme Court, has led to a shocking 
decrease in antitrust enforcement over the last three decades. The 
fIrst strand of the double helix has adopted as its mantra the 
normative cliche that "the antitrust laws protect competition, not 
competitors." This mantra has been lionized far beyond its humble 
normative origins to laud and encourage the growth of dominant 
fIrms and monopolies while remaining indifferent to the effects of 
predatory conduct on competitors. The end result has been a striking 
reduction in the enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as well as the Robinson-Patman Act, 
over the past three plus decades. 
The second strand of the ChicagolHarvard double helix has 
essentially counseled us to shield dominant fIrms and monopolies 
from antitrust juries through anti-democratic and paternalistic judicial 
interventions. The ostensible cover for this reduction of antitrust 
plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment jury rights has been the unsupported 
assertion that antitrust cases and Chicago/Harvard economic theories 
are too complex for jurors. To further buttress their goals, the 
Chicago/Harvard theoreticians have convinced the courts to 
rationalize and keep away from juries hard-core evidence of 
predatory intent. 
Applying an evolutionary approach to our antitrust laws and their 
enforcement, it is time to unravel and replace the Chicago/Harvard 
antitrust double helix. We should substitute its philosophic strands 
with base pairs dedicated to guarding competitors against predatory 
conduct and aggressive mergers by dominant fIrms and monopolies, 
and reviving antitrust jury trials. 
In guarding competitors, we need not and should not protect 
economically unfit competitors from the rigors of fair competition. 
We should, however, eschew the normative cliche that "the antitrust 
laws protect competition, not competitors," by reinvigorating and 
revitalizing the enforcement of our Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
Guarding competitors against predatory conduct and aggressive 
mergers will protect the competitive diversity and variety necessary 
for a stable, thriving, and innovation-oriented economic ecosystem. 
In reviving antitrust jury trials, we will reverse the anti-democratic 
shielding of dominant fIrms and monopolies from effective public 
oversight, and restore a proper regard for our Seventh Amendment. 
As part of this strategy, we should allow antitrust juries to fully 
evaluate and assess evidence of dominant firms' and monopolies' 
predatory intent in carrying out strategic and exclusionary activities. 
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From an evolutionary standpoint, juries are far better-equipped than 
judges straitjacketed by ChicagolHarvard economic theories3!O to 
assess and resolve predatory conduct issues. 
The ChicagolHarvard antitrust double helix has provided the 
philosophical bases for the diminished enforcement of our antitrust 
laws for more than thirty years. The overall economic results have 
not matched the ChicagolHarvard rhetoric3!! while the growth of 
economic institutions "too big to fail,,3!2 is of grave concern. It is 
therefore time to begin basing the interpretation and enforcement of 
our antitrust laws upon a new philosophical double helix that will 
protect and promote our long-term economic diversity and innovation 
opportunities by guarding competitors; and reinvigorate our 
community-based morals and ethics by reviving antitrust jury trials. 
310. If Chicago/Harvard economic theories are "too complex" for juries to understand and 
apply, the primary reason may be that they do not comport with jurors' common sense 
and evolutionary notions of justice and fairness. Nor do such theories represent or 
comport with our community-based standards of moral authority. See, e.g., Robert C. 
Solomon, Business Ethics, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 354, 358 (Peter Singer ed., 
1991) ("However competitive a particular industry may be, it always rests upon a 
foundation of shared interests, and mutually agreed-upon rules of conduct, and the 
competition takes place not in a jungle but in a community, which it presumably both 
serves and depends upon."). 
311. See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 145, at 303 ("[W]hen economic performance is 
actually examined, we have seen, it casts serious doubt on the assertion that bigness is 
the guarantor of operating efficiency, innovation efficiency, or social efficiency. "); 
DAVIDSON, supra note 1, at 54, 149-56 (discussing a variety of historical, behavioral, 
and game theory reasons why innovation is likely to be reduced in markets that are 
more concentrated); ZOLTAN J. Acs & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL 
FIRMS (1990) ("[C]ontrary to much of the conventional wisdom, innovative activity is 
apparently hindered, not promoted, in concentrated markets."); Spencer Weber 
Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 833, 
873-74 (2011) ("[T]here is mounting evidence from corporate fmance communities 
that suggests entire categories of deals are more fraught with peril and more likely to 
destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value. Together, these sources and 
studies suggest that certain categories of mergers destroy shareholder value and do 
little, if anything, to create meaningful efficiencies or to enhance market 
competition. "). 
312. See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 145; DAVIDSON, supra note 1; LYNN, supra note 
146; SORKIN, supra note 142; Foer, supra note 145. 
